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Abstract  
Demand for Cigarettes by Teenagers and Young Adults and Their Smoking Transitions 
by  
Ce Shang 
 
Adviser: Professor Michael Grossman 
 
This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of the effects of cigarette prices, 
cigarette excise taxes, smoke-free air laws, youth access laws, state spending on comprehensive 
tobacco control programs, socio-economic factors, and demographic characteristics on measures 
of demand for smoking, especially light and intermittent smoking by teenagers and  young adults 
in a long panel. I employ the panel to estimate demand for cigarette smoking by young people 
and the determinants of transitions from light or intermittent smoking to heavy or regular 
smoking in the following years. Finally, I estimate transitions in the opposite direction: from 
regular or heavy smoking to light or intermittent smoking and to quitting. My findings indicate 
that the cigarette price and the price change significantly reduce the smoking prevalence, the 
conditional cigarette consumption, and the probabilities of some progressive smoking transitions, 
as well as increase the probabilities of regressive smoking transitions. The price elasticities 
implied for demand for cigarettes and smoking transitions are consistent with the previous 
literature. In addition, most smoke-free-air laws, youth access laws, state spending on 
comprehensive tobacco control programs are effective in preventing progressive smoking 
transitions or promoting regressive transitions.  
 Cigarette smoking is the leading cause of premature death in the United States and is 
directly responsible for nearly one-third of all cancer deaths. Knowledge of the effects of tobacco 
policies in reducing smoking will have very important public health implications. The findings 
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from my study provide invaluable information to policy makers in decreasing the tremendous 
burden of tobacco related disease. 
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Introduction 
Cigarette smoking is the single most preventable cause of death and disability in the 
United States. It is responsible for an estimated 443,000 deaths or nearly 1 of every 5 deaths each 
year in the United States. In particular, cigarette smoking causes coronary heart disease, acute 
myeloid leukemia, as well as cancers of lung, kidney, pancreas, bladder, larynx, pharynx, cervix, 
stomach, esophagus, oral cavity, and uterus. In addition, cigarette smoking increases the risks of 
stroke, infertility, preterm delivery, stillbirth, low birth weight and Sudden infant death 
syndrome. Despite the deleterious health consequences of cigarette smoking, an estimated 46.0 
million adults in the US were current smokers in 2008, representing 20.6 percent of the total 
United States adult population (CDC 2008). Among these adult smokers, considerable evidences 
indicate that most of them initiate and develop their smoking behavior when they are adolescents 
or young adults. Research also shows that more than a third of all children who ever try smoking 
a cigarette become regular, daily smokers before leaving high school (CDC 1998). It is very 
critical to understand how teenagers and young adults make decisions on demand for cigarettes 
and the dynamics of their smoking trajectories. This study contributes to the literature on youth 
smoking in two aspects. First, few prior studies have examined the dynamics or development of 
smoking by teenagers and young adults in a long panel. A close examination of transitions into 
and out of different levels of smoking is highly demanded. In this paper, I estimate the 
determinants of transitions of smoking in teenage to early adulthood, when most people 
experiment with smoking and develop their smoking patterns. Second, it is necessary to revisit 
the study on demand for smoking in a period when a historically high price of cigarettes driven 
by more aggressive cigarette taxes and Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) has been observed. 
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Moreover, many newly developed policy interventions have emerged, such as bans on smoking 
in certain locations and various comprehensive tobacco control programs.  In this analysis, I use 
recent data during year 1997 to 2007 to estimate the effects of determinants on measures of 
demand for smoking in various frameworks. The results in this paper yield important information 
for policy makers who are concerned about the tremendous burden related to tobacco use. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 provides a brief history of smoking prevention 
and background of the literature on demand for smoking and smoking transitions. Section 2 
describes the panel and defines the transition matrices. Section 3 estimates the effects of 
determinants on demand for smoking in three frameworks (conventional, myopic and rational 
addiction models). Section 4 estimates the transitions of smoking and their determinants in 
discrete hazard model.  
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1. A Brief History of Smoking Prevention 
Efforts to reduce cigarette smoking prevalence in the United States began in the mid 
1960s following the release of the first Surgeon General’s report which casually linked cigarette 
smoking to lung cancer and a host of other diseases. Since then, many tobacco control strategies 
have been adopted, including spread dissemination of information and consumer education on 
the risks of smoking, and various public policy interventions. Beginning in the 1990’s a new era 
of tobacco control emerged. This Period has been characterized by an unprecedented number of 
states increasing cigarette excise taxes and implementing stronger control restrictions, like bans 
on smoking in private worksite and other public places, stronger youth restrictions and created 
many comprehensive tobacco control programs. Since January 1, 1998, 43 states and the District 
of Columbia have increased their excise taxes on cigarettes at least once. As of October 1, 2007 
state excised tax rate on cigarettes ranged from $2.58 per pack in New Jersey to $0.07 per pack 
in South Carolina. The average price of a pack of cigarettes in the United States increased from 
$2.06 per pack in November of 1997 to $4.26 per pack by November of 2006(Figure 1). The 
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was settled in 1998 when the tobacco industry agreed to 
pay the states $206 billion over a 25 years period. In addition, the four states that were not part of 
the MSA (Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota) separately settle their lawsuits with 
tobacco industry. Currently, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have smoke-free air laws 
restricting smoking in certain indoor locations. The number of states implementing complete 
bans on smoking, the most restrictive provisions, has increased dramatically over the past 
decade. For example, the number of states to ban smoking in all private worksites has increased 
from 1 in 1995 to 17 in 2007; the number of states to ban smoking in restaurants has increased 
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from 1 in 1995 to 22 in 2007; and the number of states to ban smoking in bars has increased from 
1 in 1998 to 16 in 2005. Throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s, many states also enacted laws 
that penalize minors for tobacco related offenses. For example, the number of states that 
prohibited minors from possessing tobacco products increased from 8 in 1990 to 36 in 2005. 
Similarly, the number of states that prohibited the use of tobacco products by minors increased 
from 8 in1990 to 19 in 2005. Finally, the number of states that prohibit minors from purchasing 
cigarettes increased from 14 in 1990 to 41 by the year 2003.  
1.1  Literature Review on Smoking Behavior among Teenagers and Young Adults 
In investigating cigarette demand by youth, there is a broad literature. Most papers find a 
price elasticity of cigarette consumption of -0.3 to -0.5, which indicates a 10-percent increase in 
price would reduce the cigarette consumption by 4 percentage points on average. In addition, 
some studies find that various control policies are also effective (Gruber and Zinman 2001). In a 
recent research, Carpenter and Cook (2008) find that state tobacco tax increases reduce smoking 
participation and frequent smoking by youths in post- MSA period. They estimate a teen tax 
elasticity of smoking participation of -0.05, corresponding to a price elasticity of -0.25. However, 
this study is limited to youths at school and excludes high school dropouts who may be more or 
less responsive to cigarette tax or price.  
In regards to smoking initiation, Douglas and Hariharan (1994) and Douglas (1998) find 
that cigarette prices are uncorrelated with the decision to start smoking.  However, these results 
should be interpreted with caution given that duration analysis is applied to cross-sectional data 
and retrospective information on smoking initiation. Incorrect recall by participants on smoking 
initiation, along with errors from matching price with the past residence will influence the 
results. In another study using retrospective data, Forster and Jones (2003) find that higher taxes 
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will prolong the amount of time before an eventual smoker actually initiates, although the 
magnitude of the impact is small. 
Four recent studies have found cigarette prices to be inversely related to adolescent 
smoking initiation. Nonnemaker and Farelly (2011) examined the effects of cigarette excise 
taxes and prices using recent NLSY97 data and found that cigarette price is a significant 
determinant of youth smoking initiation especially for black youth. Employing longitudinal data 
on 8th and 10th graders, Tauras, O’Malley, and Johnston (2001) examined the impact of 
cigarette prices on three alternative measures of smoking initiation: Any initiation (initiation 
based on smoking at least 1 cigarette in the previous thirty days), daily initiation (initiation based 
on smoking at least 1 cigarette per day); and heavy daily initiation (initiation based on smoking 
10 or more cigarettes per day). They found that a 10-percent increase in cigarette price decreased 
the probability of any, daily, and heavy daily smoking initiation by 2.7 percent, 8.1 percent, and 
9.6 percent, respectively. Cawley, Markowitz, and Tauras (2004) employed NLSY97 data and 
found adolescent male smoking initiation to be very responsive to changes in cigarette prices, but 
found generally insignificant price effects for young females. The average male price elasticity 
of any initiation (defined the same as Tauras et al. 2001) was estimated to be –0.86. Confirming 
the results of Tauras et al. (2001), both subsequent studies found cigarette prices to have a larger 
impact on stricter measures of smoking initiation. 
DeCicca, Kenkel et al. (2002), however, fail to find negative price effects in a study of 
smoking initiation by teenagers. This result emerges only after they include dichotomous 
variables for each state of the U.S. in a panel that spans a very short four-year time period. It is 
plausible that there is not enough price variation in the data to estimate a demand function once 
state dummies are included as regressors in a sample that spans a very short period of time. 
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Moreover, using current smoking rather than initiation as an outcome and a somewhat different 
specification, Gilleskie and Strumpf (2005) obtain negative price effects in the same data set 
used by DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios.  
In regards to smoking cessation, Douglas (1998) applies Becker and Murphy’s (1988) 
rational addiction model to the decision to quit smoking. That model predicts that the quit 
probability should be positively related to the current, past, and future price. The latter effect 
occurs because an increase in future price lowers future consumption. In turn, the marginal 
benefit of current consumption falls, and current consumption falls perhaps to zero. Similarly, an 
increase in past price lowers past consumption, which lowers the marginal benefit of current 
consumption. Despite high correlations among the current price, the price next year (future 
price), and the price last year (past price), Douglas finds positive and significant future price 
coefficients in his quit equations. This indicates that smokers in his sample are forward looking. 
The current and past price coefficients are not significant, but Douglas includes the number of 
cigarettes smoked per day at a peak period in his hazard equations. Clearly, past price may 
operate through this variable, suggesting that it should be omitted from the equations.  
Tauras and Chaloupka (2001) were the first to model smoking cessation decisions in a 
longitudinal data set (Monitoring the Future). They employed a semi-parametric Cox regression 
to assess the probability that smokers would make a transition from smoking to nonsmoking. 
They concluded that the likelihood of making a smoking cessation attempt among both men and 
women increased significantly as cigarette prices rise. The estimated price elasticity of smoking 
cessation ranged from 0.34 and 0.71 for women and between 0.27 and 0.92 for men implying 
that a 10-percent increase in price raises the probability of making a cessation attempt by up to 
10 percent. Expanding on the original study, Tauras (2004a) used the longitudinal component of 
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the Monitoring the Future surveys and employed a stratified Cox regression to model multiple 
quit attempts among young adults. His findings confirm the positive relationship between 
cigarette prices and smoking cessation. His findings suggest that a 10-percent increase in the 
price of cigarettes increases successful cessation by young adults by approximately 3.5 percent. 
Chatterji et al. (2010) investigate the effects of state tobacco control program expenditures on 
young adults smoking behavior and they find that a higher level of state spending on tobacco 
control programs is associated with a significant increase in the probability that a daily smoker 
report at least one attempt to quit smoking and reductions in the prevalence of daily smoking 
among college students. However, there findings limit to college students who are exposure to 
the tobacco control programming for a short term. 
While numerous econometric studies have examined the determinants of current 
smoking, less than a handful of econometric studies have looked into the determinants of light 
and intermittent smoking. Tauras (2004a) was the first study to examine the impact of prices and 
policies on intermittent smokers. He extracted data from the 1991, 1993, and 1994 National 
Health Interview Surveys to estimate the impact of cigarette prices and smoke-free air laws on 
some-day smoking among adults in the United States. He found that, conditional on being a 
current smoker, increasing the price of cigarettes will increase the probability of being a 
someday-smoker and consequently will decrease the probability of being an every-day smoker. 
In particular, he found that a 10 percent increase in the price of cigarettes will increase the 
probability of intermittent smoking among current smokers by 8.6 percent. He also found some-
day smokers to be more price-responsive with respect to average number of cigarettes smoked 
per month than are every-day smokers. Finally, Tauras found that more restrictive private 
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worksite laws significantly increase the prevalence of some-day smoking among current smokers 
and decrease average monthly smoking among some-day smokers. 
Two recent studies have examined the effects of cigarette prices on various levels of 
smoking intensity using cross-sectional data. Liang and Chaloupka (2002) used the 1992, 1993, 
and 1994 surveys from the Monitoring the Future project and found higher cigarette prices to be 
inversely related to cigarette consumption at all levels of smoking intensity. While higher 
cigarette prices were found to have a negative and statistically significant impact on light 
smokers, higher cigarette prices were found to have the largest impact on the heaviest smoking 
levels. These results were confirmed by Ross, Chaloupka, and Wakefield (2001), who employed 
a cross-sectional survey from The Study of Smoking and Tobacco Use among Young People 
project. 
Tauras (2005) employed nationally representative longitudinal data on young adults from 
the Monitoring the Future Surveys to examine the effects of prices and smoke-free air laws on 
smoking progression. The estimates from this study clearly indicated that higher cigarette prices 
decrease the probability that young adults would transition from a non-daily smoking level to a 
daily-smoking level between waves of data. In particular, the study found that a 10-percent 
increase in the price of cigarettes would decrease the probability of progressing from non-daily 
to daily smoking by 6.5 percent. Smoke-free air laws were found not to play a significant role in 
deterring the non-daily to daily transition among young adults. 
While much has been learned about the impact of prices and policies on cigarette 
demand, there is still much more to learn, particularly as it relates to intermittent and light 
smoking. Intermittent and light smoking currently is the most prevalent smoking status among 
teenagers and young adults. The existing studies on light and intermittent smoking use data that 
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predates the dramatic changes in cigarette prices, tobacco control policies, and the prevalence of 
light and intermittent smoking among current smokers that have occurred over the past decade. 
Moreover, none of the previous studies have allowed for the possibility that state and individual 
sentiments toward tobacco drive both the enactment of stronger tobacco control policies and the 
movement toward intermittent and light smoking. Prior studies fail to examine the influence of 
prices and policies on the transition into light and intermittent smoking from both nonsmoking 
and daily-smoking levels. In addition, no prior study has examined the effects of state spending 
on comprehensive tobacco control programs, or youth access laws on light and intermittent 
smoking. Finally, no previous study has looked at the impact of tobacco policies on smoking 
cessation decisions among light and intermittent smokers. In this paper, I reexamine the demand 
for cigarettes by teenagers and young adults in the past decade when most young smokers were 
light and intermittent smokers and dramatic changes in price and policies were going on. In 
addition, I estimate the smoking transitions in a long panel that allows many transitions to be 
observed. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the effects of cigarette prices, 
cigarette excise taxes, smoke-free air laws, youth access laws, socio-economic factors, and 
demographic characteristics on demand for smoking and transition of smoking by teenagers and 
young adults. 
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2 Data and Variable Construction 
2.1 Sample Description 
For all the empirical models that are estimated in this study, I employ 1997-2007 panels 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). NLSY97 is a nationally 
representative sample of 8,984 respondents aged 12 to 16 as of December 31, 1996. The first 
wave of NLSY97 was conducted in 1997, and individuals were followed up over years since 
then. The time period of this panel (1997-2007) allows me to examine the effects of Post-MSA 
cigarette excise tax hike and a variety of tobacco control policies on smoking trajectories and 
demand for cigarettes and by American teens and young adults. The age range of this panel (12-
28) covers the period at which many individuals initiate smoking and thereafter transit to heavier 
tobacco use. Moreover, some of the light or intermittent smokers may transit to heavy or daily 
smokers while some of them quit. The NLSY97 data allows many different paths of smoking 
transitions to be observed in a long panel, thus is very crucial to studying smoking transitions 
among teenagers and young adults and providing a complete picture of smoking trajectories. 
Each year, the respondents were asked a series of questions on health related behaviors in 
NLSY97: such as whether they have ever smoked cigarettes, consumed alcohol, or used illegal 
drugs as well as whether and how often they have engaged in these activities within the past 
month of survey. And respondents self-reported answers to the above questions. In NLSY97, 
current smoking status can be identified in two alternative ways: by the number of days smoked 
in the past thirty days (frequency) (Figure 3b) and by the average number of cigarettes smoked 
per day in the past thirty days (intensity) (Figure 3a). Hence, I attained the consumption of 
cigarettes in the past 30 days as the product of the frequency and intensity just defined. And a 
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respondent participate smoking if she reports any cigarette consumption in the past 30 days1. 
Moreover, smoking states can be identified based on either frequency or intensity: there are three 
frequency states: nonsmoking, smoking on some days (intermittent smoking), and daily 
smoking; there are also three intensity smoking states: nonsmoking, light smoking, and heavy 
smoking. I will define the aforementioned smoking states in the next paragraph. For each state in 
the prior wave, two transitions are possible. For example, an intermittent smoker in the previous 
wave could progress to daily smoking or regress to nonsmoking. Another example is that a non-
smoker in the previous wave could progress to light smoking or heavy smoking and could also 
progress to intermittent smoking or daily smoking. In another word, I attempt to estimate two 3 
by 3 transition matrices with twelve transitions to smoking destinations other than the original 
states. I create variables to identify each of these transitions in different models. In addition, 
variables for smoking initiation and quitting are also constructed. Smoking initiation is defined 
as the first record of smoking any cigarette for those who were never smokers in the previous 
waves (also referred as first-cigarette smoking initiation). Quitting is identified as the cessation 
in the current wave for those who were smoker in the previous wave. The smoking initiation and 
quitting can be observed from both the intensity and frequency. 
I employ a 15-cigarettes-per-day threshold as the upper cutoff to define light smoking: 
Those who smoke 15 cigarettes or more per day are defined as heavy smokers. Indeed, a growing 
number of published papers and government publications have used an upper threshold of 15 
cigarettes per day to define light/ heavy smoking. In particular, Farkas, Pierce et al. (1996) found 
smokers who smoke fewer than 15 cigarettes at baseline were 80 percent more likely to quit 
                                                          
1 There are 1007 observations with a positive frequency but zero intensity or vice versa during 
the 11 year interval. I define them as participants and their consumption as the positive value of 
frequency or intensity. 
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smoking at follow up (two years later) than individuals who smoked 15 or more cigarettes per 
day on average at baseline. Moreover, using 16 years of follow up data, Godtfredsen, Holst et al. 
(2002) found that there were significant reductions in mortality risks for individuals who 
sustained a light smoking habit (1-14 cigarette per day) and smokers that quit smoking as 
compared to individuals who sustained a heavy smoking habit (smoking 15 or more cigarettes 
per day). However, the study found that heavy smokers who reduced their consumption by at 
least half did not significantly reduce long term mortality from tobacco related diseases when 
compared to heavy smokers who continued to smoke at heavy rates. These findings were 
confirmed in a more recent study by Tverdal and Bjartveit (2006) that employed a 15 cigarette 
per day threshold. In the dimension of smoking frequency, I define daily smoking as smoking 
more than 25 days in the past 30 days, and intermittent smoking as smoking 25 days or less in 
the past 30 days. The practical reason for using 25 days as the cutoff is that very few people 
report to smoke between 25 and 30 days in the data.  
During year 1997 to 2007, most respondents in NLSY97 are nonsmokers. However, the 
participation rate of smoking in the past 30 days has increased from 18% in 1997 to 37% in 2007 
(Figure 4a). The average conditional consumption of cigarettes in the past 30 days has steadily 
risen over years, from about 122 cigarettes in 1997 to about 250 cigarettes in 2007 (Figure 4b). 
Majority of the smokers in NLSY97 consists of light or intermittent smokers, among those who 
report smoking any cigarette in the past 30 days, 44% are intermittent smokers and 78% are light 
smokers. In addition, I observe increasing trends for daily, light and heavy smokers for the first 
few years. The number of intermittent smokers does not vary much over the survey period. After 
2003, the composition of smoking levels in both frequency and intensity remains amazingly 
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stable (Figures 5a and 5b). In section 4, I will examine how smokers transit among these 
smoking states. 
2.2 Independent Variables from NLSY97 
Based on NLSY97, I construct independent variables that are likely to affect cigarette 
demand and transitions, these controls include: age of the respondents in each survey year, a 
quadratic for age, gender, race/ ethnicity (Asian, American Indian, Black, Black Hispanic, white 
Hispanic, other Hispanic, and white as reference group), education level (high school drop-out, 
high school diploma, enrolled in college, college graduates and enrolled in high school as 
reference group), marital status (married, separated, divorced, widowed, and single as reference 
group), household size, family structure (child lives with no parents, child lives with a step 
parent, child lives with one parent, child lives with adopted parents, and child lives with both 
parents as reference group), indicator of employed, job status in the past 30 days(hired, fired, and 
no job turnover in the past 30 days as reference group), youth income ( a sum up of earned 
income and allowance)2, indicator that equals one if a child has any religion, state fixed effects 
and survey year fixed effects. For missing values in the controls like marital status and 
enrollment status, I replace the missing with values that indicate their most possible situation by 
comparing their status in the past and the following years. For example, if a respondent was 
married in both year t-1 and year t+1 but with an unknown marital status in year t, I would 
replace the missing marital status of year t with the value that indicates married status. For the 
missing values that I cannot refill or impute using the panel features, I generate an indicator for 
the missing, and replace the missing with the mean of non-missing values of the variable of that 
year. And the indicators for missing are therefore included as covariates in the regression. 
                                                          
2 Because all respondents in round 8 were over the age of 18, question about the total allowance 
received was no longer asked. Thus the youth income after round 8 is earned income only. 
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The NLSY97 also provides geocode supplement file that contains detailed information on 
the geographic residence of each NLSY97 respondent. These data allow me to analyze the 
influences of state level cigarette prices, cigarette taxes and tobacco control policies. Based on 
the state in which the respondent resides, state level cigarette prices and cigarette excise taxes 
from The Tax Burden on Tobacco by Orzechowski and Walker (2008) are merged with NLSY 
97 data. Municipal taxes of Cook County, New York City County and counties in Virginia State 
are also merged to the respondents that report living in these counties. 3To coincide with the date 
when individuals are surveyed, I employ weighted past 30-day average prices and taxes for a 
pack of 20 cigarettes in most analysis. 4To account for changes in the relative prices and taxes of 
cigarette over time, I deflate the prices and taxes by the National Consumer Price Index 
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1982-1984=100)5.  
2.3 Tobacco Control Policy Variables 
Information on smoke-free air laws, minimum age purchase laws and spending on 
tobacco control programs is acquired from Impac Teen project. Smoke-free air laws capture the 
presence and magnitude of each state’s law on smoking in private and government worksites, 
public and private schools, healthcare facilities, recreational facilities, culture facilities child care 
                                                          
3 I thank Ann Boonn, Frank J. Chaloupka, Danny McGoldrick, Eric Lindblom, and Huang 
Jidong for the historical record of county level cigarette taxes. 
4 To be concrete, I use the prices as of November 1st reported in the Tax Burden on Tobacco. To 
obtain an estimate of 30-day average price preceding the interview date, state and federal excise 
taxes as of November 1st each year are subtracted from the November 1st prices and net-of-tax 
prices are assumed to change linearly over time. Given this assumption, estimates of the net-of-
tax price are calculated for each day through a year and the state and federal taxes in effect are 
added to these estimates. Then a past 30-day average cigarette price is calculated for each 
interview date. The 30-day average tax is a weighted average of taxes in effect in the past 30 
days. 
5 The real terms of price/tax and income are obtained by dividing the nominal terms by the 
consumer price index, which is reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, All Urban 
Consumers, series ID: CUUR0000SA0,Not seasonally adjusted, Area: U.S. city average, Item: 
All Items, Base Period: 1982-84=100. From now on, the price refers to real cigarette price. 
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centers, public transit, restaurants, free-standing bars, and shopping malls. Tobacco control 
expenditures include state level tobacco control funding per capita and state level other tobacco 
control funding. I present the coding scheme for each policy variable in the appendix. For most 
policies, I use a level variable to indicate the levels of the restriction. In addition, I create an 
indicator for smoking ban in free-standing bar and indicators for each level of laws in worksites 
and schools. Information on minimum age purchase laws includes the minimum age for cigarette 
sale (18 or 19 years old) and youth purchase index which indicates the number of youth purchase 
laws. I create an indicator for each of the minimum age for sale laws and youth purchase 
indexes. In the analysis of smoking transitions, I do not estimate the effects of the minimum age 
for cigarette sale, due to that only state New Jersey had changed their minimum age law in post 
1997 period, and there is not enough variation to examine the effect of the law, especially for 
transitions that are estimated using much smaller samples.6 
 
                                                          
6 To justify the inclusion of the policy variables, I regress each policy variable on state and year 
fixed effects. The fixed effects usually account for less than 80% of the variation of policy 
variables other than the minimum age purchase law indicators.  
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3 Cigarette Demand by Teenager and Young Adults 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
In this section, I examine the demand for cigarettes by teenager and young adults. The 
empirical models of cigarette smoking are based on economic theory of demand. In order to 
derive cigarette demand equations, an individual utility function must first be assumed. This 
utility function has cigarettes, other goods, and tastes as factors. An individual maximized her 
utility subject to a budget constraint, which is comprised of the price of cigarettes, income and 
the prices of all other goods. The constrained maximization yields a derived demand function for 
cigarettes. This derived demand function shows that cigarette consumption is related to the price 
of cigarettes, prices of related goods, income, and tastes. In addition, I appeal to addiction model 
(Becker and Murphy 1988; Becker, Grossman et al. 1991; Becker, Grossman et al. 1994) as the 
theoretical framework of this paper. In the addiction model, consumptions of the addictive good 
are linked over time, and the derived demand function under this framework implies current 
consumption a function of the current price, past and future consumptions. However, the setup of 
the addiction model introduces difficulties to empirical analysis. For instance, ordinary least 
square (OLS) does not yield consistent estimates due to the unobserved life cycle utilities. 
Therefore, two stage least square (TSLS) is required in this context to obtain consistent 
estimates. The following subsections of section 3 proceed as follows: I estimate the demand 
equations (the participation equation and the conditional consumption equation) in conventional 
model that are free of addiction behavior, myopic addiction without forward looking and rational 
addiction model ((Becker and Murphy 1988; Becker, Grossman et al. 1991; Becker, Grossman et 
al. 1994).  
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Furthermore, the tobacco control policies affect cigarette demand through “Full price” of 
cigarettes. The “Full price” of cigarette can be thought of as the sum of the monetary purchase 
price of cigarettes and the costs associate with obtaining and consuming cigarettes. Therefore, 
any policy that increases the monetary price of cigarettes (for example, increased excise taxes), 
make cigarette more difficult to obtain (for example, minimum legal purchase age restrictions), 
or raises the inconvenience costs associate with consumption (for example, clean indoor air laws) 
will increase the “full price” of cigarettes. According to the basic law of economics, as the “full 
price” of a good raise, the quantity demand of that food will decrease. Thus, I estimate the effects 
of all tobacco control policies in addition to cigarette prices and taxes in all models.  
3.2 Demand Function of Teenagers and Young Adults 
3.2.1 Conventional Two-part Models of Cigarette Demand 
I estimate cigarette demand equations based on two-part model developed by cragg 
(1971), in which participation of smoking and conditional consumption of smoking are estimated 
using separate equations. I prefer this model to Heckman’s procedure in this context for the 
following reasons: First, the sample selection model introduced by Heckman (1979) is good at 
modeling the potential outcomes, and is widely applied in wage equation estimation when 
outcomes are only observed for people who work above the reservation wage and potential wage 
is a modeling issue. However, potential smoking is not a concern in modeling smoking. And 
two-part model is more robust to violations of the Normality assumption. Moreover, based on the 
collinearity test, two-part model is strongly preferred to sample selection model in the case of 
cigarette smoking (Madden 2008). To estimate the two-part model, the linear probability model 
is used to estimate the participation equation in the first step, and OLS is used to estimate the 
cigarette consumption given participation in the second step.  
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Throughout this paper, I include state fixed effects to control for the potential 
endogeneity of state cigarette prices or taxes and state tobacco control policies. There is a broad 
literature discussing the unobserved state sentiment toward tobacco that may affect smoking 
behaviors, cigarette prices or taxes, and tobacco control policies in general, which may yield 
biased estimates of the interest effects. To control for this unobserved state smoking sentiment 
and other relevant state level time-invariant unobservable effects, I include state fixed effects in 
all the models that are estimated in this paper with few exceptions. In addition, through the entire 
study period, the state and year fixed effects only account for 80 percent of the variation in 
cigarette price, which leaves enough variation to study price effects on cigarette demand and 
smoking transitions. The second strategy is to allow the sentiment to vary over time and states. 
Therefore, I estimate specifications that substitute state fixed effects with a measure of anti-
smoking sentiment (SASS) developed by Decicca et al. (2008). They used the responses to the 
smoking attitude questions in TUS-CPS data and created this measure of state anti-smoking 
sentiment that varies over state and year. The results of the alternative specifications with the 
SASS measure are reported in the appendix tables. 
Given the panel nature of NLSY97, the disturbance terms of a given person in different 
years are likely to be serially correlated. The disturbance terms of different persons within the 
same state are also likely to be correlated. To account for these correlations, I cluster the standard 
errors at the state level to allow for the correlations of the disturbance terms between whoever 
resides in the same state.  
3.2.1.1 Results 
I present descriptive statistics of the NLSY97 data in Table 1. This table shows that one 
third of the youth and young adults are smokers over the survey period (Figure 4a). And the 
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number of conditional consumption of cigarette in the past 30 days is 223 (Figure 4b), which is 
around 11 packs of cigarettes (each pack contains 20 cigarettes). Real cigarette price is in 1980 
dollars, and at an average of $1.89. The average age of the respondents is 20 years. 89 percent of 
the respondents are white. The education level is evenly distributed: 17 percent of the 
respondents are college graduates, 20 percents are enrolled in college, 20 percents are high 
school graduates, 32 percents are enrolled in high school, and 11 percents are high school 
dropouts.  
Columns 2 and 4 in Table 2 contain the estimates from the two demand equations. 
Cigarette price (From now on, cigarette price or tax refers to real terms) has negative and 
statistically significant impacts on both cigarette consumption equation and smoking 
participation equation. I estimate a price elasticity of demand of -0.3, which falls in the narrow 
range of -0.3 to -0.5 that most studies report. This elasticity suggests a 10-percent increase in the 
cigarette price decreased the cigarette consumption by 3 percent. The estimated participation 
elasticity is -0.24, suggests that a 10-percent increase in the cigarette price will decrease the 
probability of smoking by 2.4 percent. DeCicca et al. (2002) summarized a “consensus” estimate 
of price elasticity of youth smoking participation at -0.7 from various previous studies. My 
estimate of youth smoking participation elasticity is smaller, but is very close to the estimate of -
0.27 reported by Sloan and Trogdon (2004). 
In the previous model, I assume that unobserved individual heterogeneity does not exist 
and OLS estimates are consistent. However, it is fair to consider that there is unobserved 
individual heterogeneity in a longitudinal data. Moreover, Becker and Murphy (1988) point out a 
key source of unobserved heterogeneity in addiction behavior such as smoking: namely, present 
oriented individuals are potentially more addicted to harmful goods than future oriented 
20 
 
individuals because an increase in past consumption leads to a smaller rise in the full price of the 
good when the future is more heavily discounted. Orphanides and Zervos (1995) expand the 
sources of heterogeneity by noting that consumption of an addictive good is not equally harmful 
to everyone and because subjective beliefs about this harm differ among individuals. It also 
arises because cigarette smoking by teenagers and young adults is subject to peer effects (Lewit, 
Coate et al. 1981; Powell, Tauras et al. 2005), and the magnitude of these effects can vary among 
individuals. 
To control for the potential heterogeneity, I use within transformation to eliminate the 
unobserved individual effect. This approach provides equivalent results to the regression with 
individual dummies as regressors. The consistent estimates from the fixed effect model are very 
important to examine the robustness of the estimates from conventional model in this analysis. 
Since Hausman test prefers fixed effect model to random effect model in both the cigarette 
participation equation and the consumption equation, the individual fixed effects need to be 
controlled to obtain consistent estimates. 
Columns 2 and 5 in Table2 contain the estimates from the cigarette demand equation and 
the participation equation after accounting for the individual fixed effects and state fixed effects. 
Real cigarette price has a negative and statistically significant impact on cigarette consumption. 
The estimate of the price elasticity of demand is -0.15. This elasticity suggests that a 10-percent 
increase in the real cigarette price decreased the cigarette consumption by 1.5 percent, which is 
slightly smaller than that of the conventional OLS model. The estimated participation elasticity is 
-0.04, and not statistically significant from zero. While in Columns 3 and 6, I model both 
equations in an alternative approach, namely, including the individual fixed effects but excluding 
the state fixed effects in the specification. This approach is based on an assumption of no movers 
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over years. The estimated price elasticity of demand and the estimated price elasticity of 
participation are at -0.15 and -0.07 respectively, and both of them are significant. The price-
responsiveness in conditional consumption demand is robust among the alternative 
specifications.  
3.3 Addictive Two-part Models of Cigarette Demand 
3.3.1 Models of Myopic and Rational Addiction  
Following Becker, Grossman et al. (1994), I assume that consumers maximize a lifetime 
utility function given by: 
𝑉 = �𝛽𝑡−1∞
𝑡=1
𝑈(𝑌𝑡,𝐶𝑡,𝐶𝑡−1, 𝑒𝑡)            (1) 
Here Yt is consumption of a composite good in period t, Ct is the consumption of an addictive 
good (cigarette in our case) in period t, Ct-1 is the cigarette consumption in period t-1, et reflects 
the effects of unmeasured life cycle variables on utility, and β is the time discount factor 
[β=1/(1+r), where r is the rate of time preference for the present]. Equation 1 yields an equation 
of current consumption of cigarettes:  
𝐶𝑡 = 𝜃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝜃𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝜃1𝑃𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑒𝑡     (2) 
Thus, I estimate a full equation with all relevant factors: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝐶𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛿3𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑠𝑡 + 𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑠𝑡 ×  𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑠𝑡 + 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝐸𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
𝑖 = 1, … . ,𝑁;  𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑠𝑡 ( 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠) 
𝑃𝑠𝑡 (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑒 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠, 𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑠𝑡 (𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑒 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠) 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑠𝑡(𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑒 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) 
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Equation 2 is the basis of the empirical analysis in this rational addiction model. In all the 
regressions, other than price, policy and socioeconomic variables, I also include an indicator of 
teenager and its interactions with all youth access laws, an indicator for current employed and its 
interaction with all smoke-free air laws in worksite, and an indicator for school enrollment and 
its interactions with all smoke-free air laws in school. Note that OLS estimation of the equation 
might lead to biased estimates of the parameters of interest. First, the unobserved variables in 
each period are likely to be serially correlated. Even if these variables are not serially correlated, 
consumptions at all periods are affected by et through the optimizing behavior. However, 
Equation 2 also suggests that  current consumption is independent of past and future prices when 
past and future consumption are held constant; any effect of past or future prices on current 
consumption must come through their effects on past or future consumption. Therefore, Equation 
2 can be estimated by TSLS with past and future prices as instrumental variables for past and 
future consumptions. Other past and future smoking control policies or socioeconomic variables 
can also serve as instruments. 
In addition, I estimate an alternative model by excluding the socioeconomic variables 
from instruments. This is different from the strategy that Beck et al. (1994) adopted since they 
also pointed out in their paper that the measurement errors in future variables may lead to a 
downward bias in the estimates of future consumptions. Furthermore, the future socioeconomic 
variables may not be exogenous because that the unmeasured life cycle variable (𝑒𝑡) in Equation 
2 may correlate to future socioeconomic variables. For example, a rise of the current cigarette 
consumption may lower future earnings and reduce the possibility of marriage in the future. This 
feedback effect violates the strict exogeneity assumption on socioeconomic variables and lead to 
inconsistency in all estimates. Nevertheless, Grossman et al. (1998) discussed the possibility to 
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use actual future socioeconomic variables as instruments when more than one socioeconomic 
variable are employed and there could be offsetting forces that eliminate the correlation between 
the predicted consumption and unmeasured life cycle variable. Thus, they show results from 
using different sets of instruments: price and policy variables with and without socio-economic 
variables. Therefore in this paper, I estimate the rational addition model using TSLS by the 
following sets of instruments: past and future prices only, past and future prices with past and 
future policy variables, and past and future price, policy and socioeconomic variables. The 
instruments that are used in estimating the myopic model are only the past forms of the 
aforementioned instrumental variables.  
Moreover, the statistical significance of the coefficient of future consumption can be 
taken as a test between rational the model of addiction and the myopic model (backward 
looking). Myopic behavior implies that the coefficients on future consumption should not be 
significant from zero in TSLS framework. While the rational model implies that it should be 
significant with same sign as the coefficient on lagged consumption. In addition, the ratio of the 
coefficient of future consumption to the coefficient of past consumption yields an estimate of 
discount rate according to the equation 2.  
The estimates from Equation 2 can be used to derive short-run and long-run demand 
elasticities for cigarettes. Short-run elasticity is attained by holding past consumption constant 
and must be smaller than the long-run one. In another word, rational and myopic models of the 
addiction behavior predict larger long-run price effects the greater is the degree of addiction. 
3.3.2 Results 
Tables 3 and 4 test the myopic addiction model and the rational addiction model of 
cigarette smoking in the two-part model. As I just discussed in section 3.3.1, I use TSLS to 
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estimate both equations. In the myopic model, the past participation and the past consumption 
are treated as endogenous. In the rational addiction model, the past and future participations are 
treated as endogenous in the participation equations; the past and future consumptions are treated 
as endogenous in the consumption equations. The first, second and third columns of each table 
contain the estimates from TSLS regressions; and the fourth columns contain the estimates from 
OLS regressions, which serve as comparisons to the results from TSLS in the first and third 
columns. The current cigarette price and smoking control policies are included in the structural 
models in all models that are estimated in this section. Current socioeconomic variables are also 
included in the structural model (Columns 1, 3 and 4) except for the second column of each 
table. In the first column of tables pertaining to the myopic model, the past price is employed as 
the only instrument for the past consumption and the past participation in the myopic model, 
which would provide estimates of just identified TSLS. Similarly, in the first column pertaining 
to the rational addiction model, one lead and one lag of the price are taken as the only two 
instruments when there are two potential endogenous variables. In the second columns, the 
instruments are exclusive of socioeconomic variables. While in the third columns, the 
instruments are inclusive of socioeconomic variables. The price and policy variables are taken as 
instruments all the time.  
In these tables, the difference of the specification and instrument sets between columns 2 
and 3 appeals to the different assumptions on exogenetiy of the socioeconomic variables. The 
underlying assumption involves a trade-off between omitted variable bias and reduction in 
endogeneity incurred by these omitted variables. The omitted bias is bigger in the models shown 
in the second columns, since the casual effects of current socioeconomic variables on current 
consumption is substantial. Nevertheless, these socioeconomic variables are more likely to 
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correlate with the past and future cigarette consumption and violate the strict exogeneity 
assumption required for consistency. Thus the potential endogenity is less in this specification as 
a reward.  
The tables also contain statistics resulting from the regression-based test with the 
hypothesis that the instrumented variables in 2SLS are exogenous. This regression-based test of 
endogeneity is robust to clustering and heteroskedasticity, and is identical to the Wu-Hausman 
test when variance covariance matrix is not adjusted. In the first step, the residuals from first 
stage regression are obtained. In the second step, the first stage residuals are included as 
additional regressors and the model is fitted via OLS. If the residuals are jointly significant in the 
second step regression, it suggests that the endogenous regressors in the model are indeed 
endogenous. I report the first stage F-statistics pertaining to the excluded instruments in the table 
as well. In columns 2 and 3 of each table, the number of instruments exceeds the number of 
instrumented variables. I therefore present the score test of over-identification in these two 
columns. The statistics in these two columns indicate that instruments are significant as a set in 
the first stage and over-identification restrictions are valid. In column 3 of both Tables 3 and 4, 
the socioeconomic variables that are included in the instrument set are past or future incomes, 
and past or future household sizes. If other socioeconomic variables, such as education status and 
marital status, are included in the instrument sets, the over-identification test rejects the validity 
of these instruments.  
Table 3 shows the estimates from the myopic model. In this model, the future 
participation and the future consumption are excluded in the corresponding structural demand 
equations. Most policies have no significant effects on the consumption of cigarettes or the 
smoking participation. There are a few exceptions: smoke-free air laws in cultural facilities and 
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smoke-free air laws in free-standing bars significantly decrease the probability of smoking 
participation. Panel A contains the estimates of Participation equation. The Column1 in this 
panel shows the results from just identified TSLS model with past price as the only instrument, 
the F-ratio of the first stage is very low and do not reject the hypothesis that the instrument has 
zero effect on past participation, suggesting that the instrument is very weak and the results in 
this column could be severely biased. The estimated effects of past participation on current 
participation are positive and significant in both OLS and TSLS regressions reported in columns 
2 and 3. According to Regression–based test of endogeneity, the consistency of OLS estimator is 
not rejected in most models. The over-identification tests do no reject the over-identification 
restrictions at 5% level in Columns 2 and 3 of each table. F-ratios in the first stage show that the 
instruments have significant effects on instrumented variables in both Columns 2 and 3.  The 
estimated price effect is negative and significant in these columns as well. The estimated average 
price elasticity of participation from myopic model on is -0.1 corresponding with a long-run 
elasticity of -0.4. 
Panel B contains results from models estimating conditional consumption equation. In all 
models, the effects of past consumption on current consumption are positive and significant, and 
the cigarette effects are negative and significant. F-ratios in first stage and over-identification 
tests do not reject that the instruments are valid. The average short-run elasticity of cigarette 
consumption is -0.2 with its long-run counterpart of -0.45. 
I estimate the rational addiction model and show the results in Table 4. The first column 
employs one lag and one lead of cigarette price as instruments for just-identified TSLS 
regressions. Again, the results in the first column are not informative since the instruments are 
weak especially for the future consumption and participation. The specifications in Columns 2 
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and 3 correspond with the choices in covariates in the myopic model. In these two columns, F-
ratios in first stage and over-identification tests do not reject that the instruments are valid.  
In the rational addiction model, most policy variables are not very effective in reducing 
the prevalence of smoking or consumption of smoking. As what I show in Panel A of Table 4, 
the minimum age for sale law at 18 year old and smoke-free air laws in school that restrict 
smoking to separately ventilated areas (Level 2) are the only two policies that significantly 
reduce the participation probability. The estimates from consumption equation are presented in 
Panel B of Table 4, smoke-free air laws in worksite that Restrict smoking to separately ventilated 
areas (Level 2) and smoke-free air laws in public transit significantly decrease the number of 
cigarettes consumption.  
The results shown in table 4 confirm rational addiction model. The future and past 
participations significantly raise current participation. The average short-run price elasticity of 
participation is -0.06, and the average long run elasticity is about -0.3. The future and past 
consumptions have positive and significant effects on current consumption. Cigarette price 
significantly decreases the number of cigarette consumption. On average, the short run price 
elasticity of consumption is -0.12, and the long run elasticity is -0.35. The estimated participation 
elasticities are larger in rational addiction model than those in myopic model. The consumption 
elasticities in rational addiction model are smaller in short run and larger in long run than those 
in myopic model.   
As I discussed before, the ratio of the coefficient of future consumption to the coefficient 
of past consumption from the model of rational addiction provides an estimate of the discount 
factor. Using the estimates from Columns 2 and 4 in Table 4, I estimate the discount factors for 
participation equation and consumption equation respectively. For the participation equation, the 
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estimates imply negative discount factors throughout different models; for consumption 
equation, the estimated discount factors are 1.24, 1.35 and 1.02, corresponding to interest rates of 
24%, 35% and 2%.  
3.4 Conclusion 
Using NLSY97 geocode data, I estimate the demand function for cigarettes by teenagers 
and young adults in the conventional model and models of addiction. Since my sample mainly 
consists of light and intermittent smokers in the past decade, this analysis yields estimates of 
price elasticitis for this particular group. My findings suggest that smoking is an addictive 
behavior for young population. The results from rational addiction approach show that future 
consumption or future participation is significant in structural demand functions. This evidence 
indicates that cigarette smoking may be rational for youths. After evaluating smoke-free air laws, 
youth access laws, and state spending on comprehensive tobacco control programs, I find that, 
youth access laws significantly reduce both participation and cigarette consumption. Smoke-free 
air laws in work-site and tobacco control funding significantly reduce smoking participation. My 
findings also confirm that price is most effective among all interventions: the price effects are 
very robust in all equations and models. 
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4 Smoking Transitions by Teenager and Young Adults 
4.1 Introduction 
In this section, I describe the dynamics of smoking and employ discrete time hazard 
model to estimate the determinants of each smoking transition discussed in this paper. The 
advantage of a panel data such as NLSY97 is that longitudinal survey tracks individual smoking 
status over time, allows me to match prices and policies to the respondents precisely, and 
provides a complete picture of smoking transitions.  
In NLSY97, I identify the smoking transitions by smoking frequency and intensity. The 
smoking frequency and intensity are attained by asking respondents how many days they smoked 
and how many cigarettes they smoked per day in the past 30 days. Accordingly, smoking more 
than 25 days in the past 30 days is used to define everyday smoking. Smoking 15 cigarettes or 
more per day in the past 30 days is used to define heavy smoking. The transitions that are 
estimated include smoking initiation, quitting, restarting after quitting, transitions from 
nonsmoking to light or heavy smoking, transition from light smoking into heavy smoking or 
quitting, transition from heavy smoking into non-heavy smoking, transition from nonsmoking to 
intermittent smoking or daily smoking, transition from intermittent smoking into everyday 
smoking or quitting, and transition from every day smoking to intermittent smoking or quitting. 
In general, transitions can be either progressive or regressive. The progressive smoking includes 
initiation, restarting, and smoking transitions to a heavier or more frequent level. The regressive 
smoking includes quitting, and smoking transitions to a lighter or less frequent level. 
 For transitions to multiple destinations, I use competing risk model to estimate them 
simultaneously. For each transition, respondents can be in risk pool for multiple times as long as 
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they are at risk of making that particular transition. This model is essentially the simultaneous 
estimation of binary logistic equations that allows for all possible comparisons among outcome 
categories. For example, this model allows an individual who is currently an intermittent smoker 
to be simultaneously at risk of remaining an intermittent smoker, progressing into daily smoker 
and regressing into cessation. Reduction in smoking may also occur slowly through an 
intermediate level of smoking while others may move directly from heavy smoking to 
nonsmoking (quitting). After making the transition, the respondents dropped out of risk pool, 
unless they make an opposite transition later and return to the risk pool of the estimated 
transition afterwards. I further assume that the effects of determinants on a particular transition 
are same for multiple spells or repeated events of that transition.  
In this paragraph, I provide a thorough description of each transition. A respondent can 
be a non-smoker, light smoker, or heavy smoker at the baseline period. In an alternative 
dimension based on the smoking frequency, a respondent can be a nonsmoker, intermittent 
smoker or daily (everyday) smoker at the baseline period. One can certainly define a transition 
based on both dimensions, for example, the transition from a heavy and daily smoker to a light 
and intermittent smoker. However, given most of my observations are nonsmokers, there are not 
enough power to evaluate the determinants of such transitions. Therefore, I only estimate and 
discuss the transitions in either smoking frequency or smoking intensity. For regressive smoking 
transitions, smokers at baseline are at risk of quitting; correspondingly, heavy smokers are at risk 
of transiting into light smoking and nonsmoking; and daily smokers are at risk of transiting into 
intermittent smoking and nonsmoking. For progressive transitions, never smokers are at risk of 
smoking initiation. Quitters or ex-smokers are at risk of restarting. And nonsmokers in total are 
at risk of transiting into light, heavy, intermittent and daily smoking. On the other hand, 
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intermittent smokers are at both risk of making regressive transition into non smokers and 
progressive transition into daily smokers. Light smokers are at risk of making regressive 
transition into nonsmoker and progressive transition into heavy smokers. Respondents that do 
not change smoking status and remain at risk pool are right-censored observations that stay in the 
sample throughout the period. 
Table 5 contains the sample transition frequencies. The most common progressive 
transitions in two consecutive years are transition from nonsmoking to light smoking (5.31%) 
and transition from nonsmoking to intermittent smoking (4.50%). The regressive transitions of 
light smoking and intermittent smoking (transition from light smoking to nonsmoking and 
transitions from intermittent smoking to nonsmoking) are more common than progressive 
transitions of them (transition from light smoking to heavy smoking and transition from 
intermittent smoking to daily smoking). 
In addition, Table 5b explicitly presents two transition matrices of smoking frequency 
and smoking intensity respectively. The upper panel shows the transition matrix of smoking 
intensity in the form of  �
Pr (𝑌𝑡 = 0|𝑌𝑡−1 = 0) Pr (𝑌𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑡−1 = 0) Pr (𝑌𝑡 = 2|𝑌𝑡−1 = 0)
𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑡 = 0|𝑌𝑡−1 = 1) Pr (𝑌𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑡−1 = 1) Pr (𝑌𝑡 = 2|𝑌𝑡−1 = 1)Pr (𝑌𝑡 = 0|𝑌𝑡−1 = 2) Pr (𝑌𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑡−1 = 2) Pr (𝑌𝑡 = 2|𝑌𝑇−1 = 2)� , 
with 0, 1 and 2 representing nonsmoking, light smoking and heavy smoking respectively. While 
the lower panel presents the transition matrix based on smoking frequency.  
The determinants that I estimate for smoking transitions are same with those I estimate 
for demand for smoking. State and year fixed effects are included in all transition models. In 
addition, I include the cigarette consumption at baseline in the regressions for transitions from 
any smoking (quitting, transitions from light smoking or intermittent smoking to any destination, 
and transitions from heavy smoking or daily smoking to any destination ). I estimate transitions 
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between two smoking states in a binary logistic model (such as smoking initiation, quitting, 
restarting and the transition from heavy smoking to non-heavy smoking) and transitions from 
one state to multiple destinations in a competing risk model (such as transitions from light 
smoking/intermittent smoking to other states). The general binary logistic model to estimate 
smoking initiation, cessation and restarting can be described as follows: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡) = Λ(𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑠𝑡 + 𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑠𝑡 × 𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 +                            𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑠𝑡 + 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝐸𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑛𝑖𝑡) (3)7 
𝑖 = 1, … . ,𝑁;  𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑠𝑡 ( 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠) 
𝑃𝑠𝑡 (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑒 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠, 𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑠𝑡 (𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑒 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠) 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑠𝑡(𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑒 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) 
In all the regressions, Other than price, policy and socioeconomic variables, I also include an 
indicator of teenager and its interactions with all youth access laws, an indicator for current 
employed and its interaction with all smoke-free air laws in worksite, and an indicator for school 
enrollment and its interactions with all smoke-free air laws in school. I also present the Kaplan-
Meier survival estimates of smoking initiation, cessation and restarting in Figures 6-8. 
 A simplified form of the competing risk model in the discrete time context can be 
estimated in multinomial logit model after the data is transformed.8  
Pr�𝑌𝑡 = 𝑗|𝑌𝑡−1,..1 = 0� = 𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑗∑ 𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑗2𝑗=0  , 𝑗 = 0, 1, 2,� Pr (𝑌𝑡 = 𝑗)2𝑗=0 = 1           (4)  
                                                          
7 In Initiation, t=1998,…, the year of  failure; t=1998,…,2007 for censored respondents. In 
cessation and restarting t is analysis time, t= fist year at risk pool,… ,the year of failure or 2007 
for right censored sample.  
8 The sample consists of people who are at risk pool and who make the transitions. Individuals 
drop out of sample once they make the transition, thus the t in this model is the analysis time that 
are described in footnote 7. 
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This equation is used to estimate transitions to multiple destinations. The independent variables 
are same with those described in Equation 3. As indicated in footnote 8, t=0 is the baseline 
period when individuals enter the risk pool, which is not necessarily to be the same for each 
spell.  
 In addition, I estimate smoking transitions in many alternative specifications with 
different price variables (either annually average cigarette price or tax preceding the interview 
month or 30-day average cigarette price or tax preceding the interview date) and state anti-
smoking sentiment measurements (either state fixed effects or SASS). The price effects 
estimated in these various specifications are shown in appendix tables and discussed in the 
corresponding sections.  
4.2 Progressive Smoking Transitions 
In this section, I estimate progressive smoking transitions such as smoking initiation, 
smoking restarting after quitting, and transitions from non-smoking to multiple states. For 
smoking initiation, the sample consists of respondents who never smoked and respondents who 
never smoked but are observed to initiate smoking in the survey period. Therefore, the baseline 
period of smoking initiation is year 1997, when NLSY97 survey was first conducted. For 
smoking restarting, the sample consists of quitters and quitters who pick up smoking again in the 
survey period. Thus, the earliest survey year to observe the restarting of a quitter in this data is 
year 1999. In general, both never smokers and ex-smokers are nonsmokers and the determinants 
of smoking transitions are estimated using a sample with pooled never smokers and ex-smokers 
at the baseline period. The Wald test suggests that the effect of price on smoking initiation of 
never smokers is significantly different from that on restarting of ex-smokers. 
4.2.1 Smoking Initiation 
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In this section, I estimate the smoking initiation of first cigarette in a binary logistic 
model followed by robustness check using different definitions of smoking initiation. The 
sample that is at risk of first cigarette smoking initiation consists of 5096 respondents who were 
never-smokers in 1997 (Figure 7). The Kaplan-Meier estimate suggests that more than half of the 
respondents initiate smoking in 10 years (Figure 5). The dependent variable in this model is a 
binary indicator of smoking (0 for nonsmoking and 1 for smoking initiation). If a respondent 
reports to smoke any cigarette for the first time during year 1998-2007, the respondent realizes 
first cigarette smoking initiation and drops out of risk pool ever after. To be concrete, I model the 
smoking initiation as a logistic function of relevant factors, smoking related policies and one of 
the following sets of price variables: the current price only; the price change only; the past, 
current and future prices. The price is measured as the average annual price preceding the 
interview month. Grossman (2005) shows that smoking initiation depends on changes in price 
between periods instead of the current price only. Hence, with the current price held constant, 
initiation should be positively related to the past price. If one allows for rational addiction in 
decision making on smoking initiation, the future price becomes a relevant determinant of the 
interest transition. In particular, a reduction in the future price raises future consumption, the 
marginal benefit of current consumption rises, and individuals are more likely to start smoking in 
the current period. This model suggests a negative effect of future price on smoking initiation. I 
describe the reduced form equation for smoking initiation under rational addiction assumption in 
Equation 4: 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑝𝑡+1      (4) 
As I described, 𝐼𝑡 is a binary indicator for smoking initiation. I define smoking initiation as the 
behavior that nonsmokers report their first cigarette consumption in any wave during 1998-2007. 
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Please note that NLSY97 is a panel data that allows the smoking initiation to be observed. 
Compared with studies relying on cross-sectional data and retrospective questions on smoking 
initiation, this study avoids the measurement error in matching the price and other time variant 
covariates, and leads to more precise estimators. 
Table 6 shows the estimates of smoking initiation from various approaches.9 Column 1 
offers a benchmark model with current price, policy and socio-economic variables as regressors. 
Column 2 replaces the price with the changes of price between two consecutive periods. Column 
3 presents the estimates from Equation 4 with the past, current and future prices as alternative 
price variables.  
The results indicate that three Possession-Use-Purchase laws, smoke-free air laws at 
culture facilities and free-standing bars significantly reduce the probability of smoking initiation. 
On average, the enforcement of these smoke-free air laws in various locations decease the 
probability of smoking initiation by 1-2 percentage points. In addition, the state tobacco control 
funding per capita and other state tobacco control funding also reduce the probability of smoking 
initiation significantly. A dollar rise in tobacco control funding per capita decreases the 
probability of smoking initiation by 0.1 percentage point, and one million dollars’ rise in other 
tobacco control funding decreases the probability of smoking initiation by 0.4 percentage point. 
However, none of the price variables are associated with the smoking initiation. 
From Table 6B to Table 6F, I further investigate the smoking initiation of various 
definitions. Table 6B presents the results in estimating intermittent smoking initiation (the 
initiation of smoking more than 14 days in the past 30 days). The estimates indicate that annual 
                                                          
9 By definition, Smoking initiation/restarting can be observed from intensity, frequency and 
consumption of smoking. The estimates from different definitions of smoking 
initiation/restarting are similar. 
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price and most policies do not have effects on reducing intermittent smoking initiation. Smoke-
free air laws at worksite of Level 1 and 2 significantly reduce the probability of intermittent 
smoking initiation by 1-4 percentage points. The smoke-free air law at healthcare facilities also 
has reduction effect on intermittent smoking initiation. However, these effects in most 
specifications are only marginal significant. Table 6C shows the estimates pertaining to everyday 
smoking initiation, which indicate that neither the price nor policies has any effect on everyday 
smoking initiation. Table 6D to Table 6F present estimates of smoking initiation defined by 
different numbers of cigarettes smoking per day. Table 6D contains results for the smoking 
initiation of five or more cigarettes per day. The results indicate that the annual price has a 
marginal significant effect on reducing the smoking imitation. The smoke-free air laws at 
recreational facilities and free standing bars significantly decrease the initiation of five or more 
cigarettes by 3 and 7 percentage points separately. Smoke-free air law at worksite of level 2 
decreases the probability of smoking initiation of the employees by a small magnitude. Table 6E 
show the estimates of smoking initiation of ten or more cigarettes per day and find no significant 
effects of the price or policies. Table 6F contains results for smoking initiation of 15 cigarettes or 
more per day. They suggest that smoke-free air laws at worksites of all levels significantly 
decrease the initiation in this context. In addition, smoke-free air laws at recreational facilities, 
restaurants and free-standing bars all decrease this smoking initiation significantly. The tobacco 
control funding per capita and other tobacco control funding program also have reduction effects 
on the smoking initiation. The alternative specifications for each smoking initiation are presented 
in the appendix tables. The results from the specification that is exclusive of state fixed effects 
and inclusive of SASS indicate that the annual price significantly reduce the smoking initiation 
of 15 cigarette or more per day. 
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My finding is consistent with many other studies of smoking initiation that use 
longitudinal data and generally find no association between the initiation probability and 
cigarette price or tax (Douglas and Hariharan 1994; Douglas 1998; DeCicca, Kenkel et al. 2002). 
However, these findings are inconsistent with some literatures (Nonnemaker and Farrelly 2011; 
Cawley, Markkowitz, et al. 2004) that investigate the price effect on smoking initiation using the 
same data. However, some differences in estimating procedures distinguish my paper from other 
literature on smoking initiation using NLSY97 data. First, I take account for state and year fixed 
effects when estimating the effects of price and other interventions on smoking initiation, 
whereas some previous literatures did not (Cawley, Markowitsze, Tauras 2004). Second, unlike 
other papers that utilize a retrospective question on age of smoking initiation in NLSY97 and 
extend the baseline period to years that predate 1997 (Nonnemaker and Farrelly 2011), I select a 
sample of respondents that were never-smokers in year 1997 and assume that they are only at 
risk pool since year 1998. By doing so, the measurement error related to matching the price and 
policy to an uncertain residence before 1997 is avoided. I acknowledge that this leads to a shorter 
period with less price and policy variation to detect the price effect on smoking initiation, 
especially given that most smokers initiate in a very short time span. To be more concrete, in the 
period that is used in the analysis to estimate the first cigarette smoking initiation, the year and 
state fixed effects account for 86% of the price variation, which may be a concern for the 
examination. However, this analysis would yield a more precise estimator of smoking initiation 
for late initiators who were never-smokers in 1997. In addition, I include a much richer set of 
policy variables such as youth access laws, smoke-free air laws and state spending on 
comprehensive tobacco control programs and provide results from various definitions of 
smoking initiation, which consistently suggest that the price is not associated with smoking 
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initiation when state fixed effects and a rich set of policy variables described in equation 3 are 
controlled. The robustness check also indicates that, if a rich set of policy variables is included 
the price effect is sensitive to the inclusion of state fixed effects, and vice versa. The magnitude 
of the price effect on smoking initiation that is estimated with either the set of policy covariates 
or the state fixed effects is very similar to the one that is reported in other literatures that employ 
the same dataset. Thus, I would conclude that the cigarette price has negative effect on smoking 
initiation, however, this effect is only marginal significant and sensitive to the inclusion of state 
fixed effects and the set of policy variables. The estimated coefficient of the price on smoking 
initiation is very close to the one that is reported by Nonnemaker and Farrelly (2011), and imply 
a price elasticity of -0.22 without state effects and of -0.05 with state fixed effects. These elastic 
ties are quite consistent with those in the previous literatures.  
4.2.2 Smoking Restarting after Quitting  
To investigate the restarting behavior after quitting, I select a sample that consists of 
people who are smokers at t-1, quit at baseline period t and are at risk of restarting at time t+1 
(Figure 9). The Kaplan-Meier estimate suggests that more than 30 percent quitters start smoking 
again in one year and 75 percent restart smoking in 8 years after the quitting (Figure 7). 
Similarly, I examine the determinants of restarting by estimating the effects of relevant factors, 
policy interventions and one of the following sets of price variables: the current price only; price 
change only; price change, past and future prices (the prices are 30-day average prices preceding 
the interview dates). The dependent variable is an indicator for restarting (0 for quitter and 1 for 
smokers who were quitter in the previous wave). I present the results of different approaches in 
Table 7. 
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The table suggests that none of the prices are associated with smoking restarting. The 
Possession-Use-Purchase Law of Level 1 significantly decreases the probability of smoking 
restarting by 8 percentage points. Among the smoke-free-air laws, the one at Free-standing bar 
significantly decreases the probability of restarting by about 6 percentage points. The alternative 
specifications that are reported in appendix table 6 indicate that when price variables are 
averaged annually, with the current price held constant, the average price of the past year 
significantly decreases the probability of smoking restarting. In addition, the price change 
(measured by the difference between 30 day average prices preceding the interview dates of two 
consecutive years) decreases the probability of the smoking restarting. The evidence shows that 
smoking restarting is associated with the price change instead of the current price only. 
4.2.3 Smoking Transitions from Non-smoking to Other Destinations 
 Table 8A and Table 8B present the results from competing risk model which estimates 
the transitions from nonsmoking to other smoking status defined by smoking frequency and 
intensity. In this analysis, I allow for multiple spells of transitions, thus the sample consists of 
never smokers and quitters at the baseline period. Table 8A shows the results for transitions from 
non-smoking to either intermittent or daily smoking, while Table 8B shows the results for 
transitions from non-smoking to either light or heavy smoking. All price variables that are 
measured by 30-day average price preceding the interview date and most policies do not have 
effect on reducing transitions from non-smoking to other states. Smoke-free air laws at worksite 
and culture facilities decrease the probability of the transition into intermittent smoking. The 
smoke-free air law at free-standing bars and tobacco control funding per capita significantly 
decrease the probabilities of transitions into intermittent smoking and light smoking. The results 
from competing risk models also suggest that, the price and policy effects mainly pertains to 
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preventing nonsmokers from transiting into intermittent or light smoking, and that the effects on 
aggressive progressive transitions such as direct transitions into daily or heavy smoking are 
either too small to be estimated or insignificant. 
 I further report the results from alternative specifications that employ different price and 
state anti-smoking sentiment variables. The estimates from the specification that do not control 
for state fixed effects and the specification that control for SASS suggest that the price change 
measured by 30-day averages preceding the interview dates significantly decreases the 
probability of transiting into intermittent smoking by 1 percentage point. However, the price 
change does not reduce the probability of transitions into other states including transitions into 
light, heavy and daily smoking. In other specifications that estimate the effects of the annual 
price preceding the interview month, the results show that the price change and the current price 
significantly reduce the probabilities of transitions into intermittent smoking and light smoking 
by 1-2 percentage points. The results are robust to specifications that control for state fixed 
effects and SASS respectively, yet neither price has any effect on transitions from nonsmoking to 
heavy or daily smoking status. 
4.3 Regressive Smoking Transitions 
In this section, I estimate and discuss regressive smoking transitions including smoking 
cessations and smoking transitions from heavy smoking and daily smoking. Since all people at 
risk pool are smokers in regressive transitions, the consumption at baseline is taken as a 
determinant in all analyses. As expected, the consumption at baseline significantly decreases the 
probability of making a regressive transition. This suggests that the more people smoke 
cigarettes, the harder for them to cut down their cigarette use in both frequency and intensity. 
The magnitude of this effect, however, is very small. In addition, I add a fourth specification to 
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examine the determinants of regressive smoking transitions, in which the past price is excluded 
to avoid the correlation between the past price and the baseline consumption that may confound 
the estimated effects of both. 
4.3.1 Smoking Cessation 
To model the quitting probability at time t, I assume the function of quitting in a form of 
rational addiction model as follows: 
𝑞𝑡 = 𝜃1(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1) + 𝜃2𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝜃3𝑝𝑡+1   (5) 
In which 𝑞𝑡 is a binary indicator for quitting (0 for smoking and 1 for quitting). Quitting is 
observed by comparing total consumption in two consecutive periods. 10 The Kaplan-Meier 
estimate suggests that roughly 35 percent smokers quit in one year and 75 percents quit smoking 
in 10 years after they are observed to be a smoker (Figure 6). In another word, for those people 
who quit smoking in the current wave t, their current cigarette consumption is zero and their total 
cigarette consumption in the previous wave t-1 is positive. This specification nests a myopic 
model and a non-addictive model. With price held constant, the effects of past consumption and 
future price on quitting are positive. Other factors such as tobacco control policies, demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics of survey respondents also enter into the equation. 
There is an alternative model that let the quitting probability at time t be a positive 
function of the change in price between consecutive periods (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1). Colman, Grossman, and 
Joyce (2003) and Grossman (2005) show that this alternative approach is not entirely correct 
because the quit probability can be positive even if the current price equals the past price. This is 
because the quit probability is the complement of the conditional probability of continuing to 
smoke in period t given that a person smoked in period t-1. The latter probability is the ratio of 
                                                          
10 Quitting can be identified using frequency, intensity, and total consumption of cigarette 
smoking. The results are similar among different definitions of quitting.  
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the probability of smoking in period t or the smoking participation in that period at the aggregate 
level to the smoking participation rate in period t-1. An increase in 𝑝𝑡 and 𝑝𝑡−1 by the same 
amount will have no impact on 𝑞𝑡 only if the price elasticities of smoking participation in the two 
periods are same. Thus, the rational model of addiction is more nested in modeling smoking 
cessations. 
Table 8 contains the estimates of marginal effects from different quitting equations 
(Figure 8).In this analysis, I include all smokers who are at risk pool of quitting over the period, 
thus it is possible for each individual to enter the risk pool for multiple times. Columns 1-3 show 
results from estimating alternative models with three different sets of price variables: the current 
price only; the price change only; the price change, the past price and the future price. 
The estimated effect of the current price on quitting is positive and significant. So is the 
effect of the price change. Results from column 3 suggest that holding the price change constant, 
a dollar increase in the past price would increase the probability of quitting in the current period 
by 3 percentage points. However, the future price has no effect on cessation. The estimates in 
Table 8 yield an average price elasticity of cessation of 0.33. The magnitude of this elasticity 
close to the one that John Tauras estimated using longitudinal data from the Monitoring the 
Future Surveys. He used a Cox regression and found an average price elasticity of cessation at 
0.35.(Tauras 2004) Table 8 also shows that Smoke-free air laws in worksites that restrict 
smoking to separately ventilated areas (level 2) significantly increase the quitting probability of 
employees by 3 percentage points in all specifications. In addition, smoke-free air law at 
shopping malls significantly increases the quitting probability by 8-10 percentage points in the 
specifications without the past and the future prices. The effects of prices on quitting are very 
robust to alternative measurements of price variables and anti-smoking sentiments. 
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4.3.2 Transitions from Heavy Smoking to light Smoking/ Nonsmoking 
 Due to the limitation of the sample size, I estimate the transition from heavy smoking to 
other statuses (light smoking/nonsmoking) using binary logistic model (0 for heavy smokers and 
1 for the others). The sample consists of heavy smokers who smoke more than 15 cigarettes per 
day at the baseline. After including all observations that are at risk pool or make transitions, the 
sample consists of 6269 person-years. I estimate the transition in three alternative models and 
present these results in Table 9. 
Column 1 of Table 9 suggests that the current price significantly increases the probability 
of the transition to a non-heavy smoking status. A dollar increase in the cigarette price 
significantly increases the probability of transiting out of heavy smoking by 11 percent pointes, 
which implies a price elasticity of 0.699. In Column 2, I replace the current price with the price 
change in the regression. The results indicate that the effect of the price change is not significant. 
Based on one-tailed test, the results from Column 3 also suggest that, with the future price held 
constant, increases in the price change and the past price significantly increase the probability of 
the transition. The magnitudes of the coefficients are about 7 percentage points for each. One to 
three Possession-Use-Purchase laws significantly increases the probability of the regressive 
transition from heavy smoking of youth by 5-11 percentage points. The robustness check 
suggests that if price variables are measured as average annual prices that precede the interview 
month, the price effects are only significant in one-tailed test, yet the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are similar. 
In order to estimate a competing risk model of transition from heavy smoking, I use an 
alternative definition of heavy smoking with 10 or more cigarettes per day as the cutoff. The 
results are reported in Appendix Table 7B and indicate that the price significantly increases the 
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probability of transition from heavy smoking to light smoking. The price effect on transition 
from heavy smoking to non-smoking is not significant. 
4.3.3 Transitions from Daily Smoking to Intermittent Smoking/ Nonsmoking 
 For transitions from daily smoking to multiple destinations, I use the competing risk 
model to estimate them simultaneously and examine the effects of the determinants on two 
alternative transitions from daily smoking (the transition to intermittent smoking and the 
transition to nonsmoking). This exercise answers how a determinant would affect the transition 
from daily smoking compared with staying daily smoking, in a sharp way to nonsmoking (i.e 
cold turkey) or in a gradual way to intermittent smoking. 
The dependent variable in the regressions is a category variable that identifies daily 
smoking by 0, intermittent smoking by 1 and nonsmoking by 2. To apply the discrete time 
hazard competing risk model, I use multinomial logistic regression to estimate the transitions 
after dropping those who made transitions and are thereafter not at risk pool. The sample consists 
of 15577 person-years, all of whom are daily smokers at baseline. I present the results regarding 
to three models with alternative price variables in table 10. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the 
estimates of the transition from daily smoking to intermittent smoking, whereas Columns 2, 4 
and 6 show the estimates of the transition from daily smoking to nonsmoking. In general, none of 
the estimated policy variables are associated with the transition from daily smoking to 
nonsmoking, which suggests that none of these policy interventions can promote a sharp 
regressive transition from daily smoking to nonsmoking. Moreover, the consumption at baseline 
has a negligible negative effect on the smoking transition from daily smoking to nonsmoking, 
which may indicate that the baseline consumption does not have effect on quitting smoking 
abruptly. In all approaches, the cigarette price or the price change significantly raise the 
45 
 
probability of the transition into intermittent smoking and the transition into nonsmoking, which 
suggests that the price is very effective in pushing daily smokers out of their smoking status to 
either intermittent smoking or non-smoking. The estimates in columns 1 and 3 suggest that a 
dollar increase in the cigarette price or the price change raise the probability of the transition into 
intermittent smoking by 2 percentage points on average.  In the approach where the past price, 
the price change and the future price are taken as covariates (shown in Columns 5 and 6), I 
estimate a positive and significant effect of the past price on the transition to intermittent 
smoking of 3 percentage points and a positive and significant effect of the price change of 4 
percentage points. For abrupt transition from daily smoking to nonsmoking, the price effects are 
of 5-6 percentage points, which are bigger in the magnitude but only marginally significant. 
Among the policy interventions, smoke-free-air law at worksite that restricts smoking to DSAs 
(Level1) increases the probability of transiting to intermittent smoking by 1.5 percentage points 
for those who are employed. Moreover, if the future price is included in the specification, smoke-
free air law at public transit raises the probability of transition into intermittent smoking. The 
price effects are robust to the alternative specifications that are exclusive of state fixed effects 
and inclusive of SASS. However, the transitions are not sensitive to the annually average price 
variables. 
4.4 Regressive and Progressive Transitions from Light Smoking and Intermittent Smoking  
4.4.1 Transitions from Light Smoking to Heavy Smoking/ Nonsmoking 
As in section 4.3.3, I employ the competing risk model to examine the smoking 
transitions from light smoking to two possible other destinations: heavy smoking and 
nonsmoking. Table 11 presents the results from three alternative models with different price 
variables. All the models suggest that the price has no significant effects on the transition from 
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light smoking to heavy smoking, but significantly increase the probability of the transition into 
nonsmoking by 3 percentage points on average. In Columns 5 and 6, the price change, the past 
and future prices are relevant price variables in the model. The current and past prices 
significantly increase the probability of the transition into nonsmoking, and the future price has 
no effect on either transitions. The price effects are robust to the alternative specifications that 
are exclusive of state fixed effects and inclusive of SASS. However, the transitions are not 
sensitive to the annually average price variables. The consumption at baseline significantly 
increases the probability of the transition to heavy smoking by 0.03 percentage point and 
decreases the probability of the transition into nonsmoking by 0.1 percentage point. 
Corresponding to the alternative definition of light/heavy smoking with 10 or more cigarettes as 
the threshold in the previous section, the price effects on transitions from light smoking are re-
estimated and reported in Appendix Table 10B and the price effect on quitting remain 
significant. 
Smoke-free-air law at worksite that restricts smoking to DSAS (Level 1) has a significant 
effect in raising the probability of the regressive transition into nonsmoking by 3 percentage 
points for those who are employed, and decreases the probability of progressive transition from 
light smoking to heavy smoking by 4 percentage points. All Possession-Use-Purchase laws 
significantly decrease the probability of the transition into heavy smoking, yet have not effects 
on the regressive smoking transition from light smoking. Smoke-free air law in shopping malls 
significantly increases the probability of the regressive transition and has no effect on 
theprogressive transition. In contrast, smoke-free-air laws in health care facilities, recreational 
facilities and free-standing bar significantly decrease the probability of the progressive transition 
only. The magnitudes of the coefficients are about 0.7, 0.8 and 2 percentage points respectively. 
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In addition, a dollar increase in tobacco control funding per capita decreases the probability of 
the progressive transition by 0.2 percentage point.  
4.4.2 Transitions from Intermittent Smoking to Daily Smoking/ Nonsmoking 
I estimate transitions from intermittent smoking in three models with different price 
variables using the competing risk model. The estimated marginal effects are shown in Table 12. 
In general, the consumption at baseline increases the probability of the progressive transition 
from intermittent smoking to daily smoking and decreases the probability of the regressive 
transition from intermittent smoking to nonsmoking by 0.1 percentage point respectively. In the 
first two columns I present the results from estimating the effects of the current price and other 
factors on transitions, which indicates that the current price increases the probability of the 
regressive transition by 4 percentage points but has no effect on the progressive transition. In 
columns 3 and 4, I replace the current price with the price change. The price change significantly 
increases the probability of the regressive transition by 4 percentage points and decreases the 
probability of the progressive transition by 4 percentage points. I further estimate the effects of 
the past and future prices and the price change, and show the results in columns 5 and 6. The 
price change raises the probability of the transition into nonsmoking by 6 percentage points. And 
when the past and future prices are held constant, the effect of the price change on the transition 
from intermittent smoking to daily smoking is paltry. Most price effects are robust to the 
alternative specifications, and if the current price is measured by annual average, it significantly 
increases the probability of the regressive transition and decrease the probability of the 
progressive transition.  
Unlike transitions from light smoking, the transitions from intermittent smoking are not 
associated with most policy interventions in the right direction. The smoke-free air law at public 
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transit only increases the probability of the regressive transition from intermittent smoking in the 
specification that includes price change as the only price variable.  
4.5 Conclusion: 
In section 4, I discuss the trajectories of smoking among teenagers and young adults and 
estimate the determinants of each transition. I present the results through Table 6-12. These 
results indicate that the current cigarette price significantly increases the probability of all 
regressive transitions and imply price elasticities that are quite consistent with previous 
literatures11. In addition, the cigarette price significantly decreases the probability of the 
progressive transitions such as transition from intermittent smoking into daily smoking. I also 
find evidence indicating that the cigarette price reduces the probabilities of smoking restarting 
and smoking transitions from nonsmoking to other states in a marginal significant level. 
However, the price does not have effect on smoking initiation of various definitions due to the 
inclusion of state fixed effects.  In an alternative model where the price change replaces the 
current price, I am able to estimate significant and positive effects of the price change on most 
regressive transitions. In addition, the price change significantly decreases the probability of the 
progressive transition from intermittent smoking to daily smoking. I also find evidence showing 
that smoking restarting is associated with the price change instead of the current price only. In a 
third model with additional past and future prices in the equation, I estimate significant and 
positive effects of the past price on quitting and most regressive transitions. The futures price has 
no effect on any smoking transition. The effects of the current price and price change are very 
robust to alternative specifications.  
                                                          
11 The price effect on smoking transition from daily to nonsmoking is trivial in magnitude but 
nevertheless significant.  
49 
 
 To sum up the effects of policy variables on various smoking transitions, I present youth 
access laws, smoke-free air laws, and state spending on tobacco control programs that have 
significant effects on the corresponding transition in the column head in Table 13. In general, 
smoke-free air laws in worksite significantly increase the probability of regressive transitions 
such as quitting, the transition from daily smoking to intermittent smoking, and the transition 
from light smoking to nonsmoking, and decreases the probability of progressive transitions such 
as the transition from light smoking to heavy smoking and the transition from nonsmoking to 
intermittent smoking. The smoke-free air law at free-standing bars is very effective in reducing 
the progressive transitions including smoking initiation, smoking restarting, transitions from 
nonsmoking to intermittent smoking or light smoking and the transition from light smoking to 
heavy smoking. The law at culture facilities also reduces the probability of progressive smoking 
transitions such as initiation, light to heavy transition and daily to intermittent transitions. 
However, these laws do not have effects on prompting regressive transitions.  In contrast, smoke-
free air law at shopping malls significantly increases the probability of progressive transitions 
like quitting and the transition from light smoking to non-smoking, and the law at public transit 
significantly raises the probability of the transition from daily smoking into intermittent 
smoking. But neither of these laws reduces the probability of progressive transitions. This 
analysis also shows that tobacco control funding per capita significantly reduces the probability 
of progressive smoking transitions including initiation, light to heavy smoking and nonsmoking 
to either light or intermittent smoking but do not have effect in pushing regressive transitions. In 
the specifications with alternative definitions of smoking initiation, I find that that smoke-free air 
laws at worksites of all levels, smoke-free air laws at recreational facilities, restaurants and free-
standing bars, tobacco control funding per capita and other tobacco control funding program 
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reduce heavy smoking initiation. I note that the smoke-free air laws at schools are associated 
with higher probability of progressive smoking transitions and lower probability of regressive 
smoking transitions, which tempers my confidence in findings on smoke-free air laws. However, 
this may be due to that I do not distinguish the smoke-free air laws between public and private 
schools. Despite this limitation, this analysis informs the policy makers that youth access laws, 
most smoke-free air laws, and state spending on comprehensive tobacco control programs are 
effective in either preventing progressive smoking transitions or prompting regressive 
transitions. Moreover, different policies function in various stages of smoking trajectories and 
development, which suggests that a comprehensive package of smoking related policies are 
highly demanded for reducing the prevalence of cigarette use and the consumption of cigarettes. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics a 
Description of Variables in the Data Set 
Variable  Description Mean  S.D. 
  Smoking Participation Smoking any cigarette in the past 30 days 0.33 0.47 
  Consumption of cigarettes Consumption of cigarettes given smoking 223 264 
  Smoking Frequency #of days that a respondent has smoked in the past 30days given smoking 20.47 11.72 
  Smoking Intensity #of cigarettes per day that a respondent has smoked in the past 30days given smoking 8.56 8.64 
  real cigarette price Average real price of cigarette: 30 days average preceding interview 1997-2007 (1980 
dollars) 
1.89 0.48 
  real cigarette tax Average real tax of cigarette : 30 days average preceding interview 1997-2007 (1980 
dollars) 
0.54 0.32 
Demographic and Socioeconomic Variables 
  Age  Age at interview 19.69 3.56 
  Male Gender 0.5 0.5 
  Household Size # of people in the household 3.83 1.73 
  Employment status  Employed in the past 30 days, indicator 0.56 0.5 
  Hired Hired in the past 30 days, indicator 0.07 0.26 
  Fired Fired in the past 30 days, indicator 0.09 0.29 
  Total income Income from employment and allowance (1980 hundred dollars) 32.6 57.1 
  No parents Living without parents in the household, indicator 0.48 0.5 
  Step parent Living with step parents in the household, indicator  0.07 0.26 
  One parent Living with one parent in the household, indicator  0.17 0.38 
  adopt parent Living with adopted parent in the household, indicator  0.01 0.08 
  Native  Race, indicator  0.01 0.1 
  Asian Race, indicator  0.02 0.14 
  Hispanic Black Race, indicator  0.004 0.06 
  Hispanic White Race, indicator   0.08 0.28 
  Black Race, indicator   0.27 0.44 
  Other Hispanic Race, indicator  0.13 0.33 
  Other race Race, indicator  0.86 0.35 
  Religion Indicator for Having religious  0.86 0.35 
  Married Marital status, indicator 0.09 0.29 
  Separated Marital status, indicator 0.004 0.06 
  Divorced marital status, indicator  0.01 0.09 
  High school dropout Enrollment status, indicator 0.11 0.31 
  Enroll in College Enrollment status, indicator   0.2 0.4 
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  High school degree Highest grade completed, indicator 0.2 0.4 
  college graduates Highest grade completed, indicator 0.17 0.37 
Minimum Age Purchase Laws    
  #Youth purchase Index:1 One Youth purchase law exist in the state of resident, indicator 0.06 0.23 
  #Youth purchase Index:2 Two Youth purchase laws exist in the state of resident, indicator 0.13 0.33 
  #Youth purchase Index:3 Three Youth purchase laws exist in the state of resident, indicator 0.06 0.24 
  minimum age for sale:18 yrs old Age<18 and living in a state with minimum age for sale at 18 yr old, indicator 0.29 0.45 
  minimum age for sale:19 yrs old Age<19 and living in a state with minimum age for sale at 19 yr old, indicator 0.01 0.11 
Smoke-free Air Laws    
  SFA laws in worksites: Level1 Employed and the state level smoke-free air laws are in level 1, indicator 0.29 0.45 
  SFA laws in worksites: Level2 Employed and the state level smoke-free air laws are in level 2, indicator 0.08 0.27 
  SFA laws in worksites:Level3 Employed and state level smoke-free air laws are in level 3, indicator 0.09 0.28 
  SFA laws in schools: Level 1 Enrolled and state level smoke-free air laws in school are at level 1, indicator 0.14 0.34 
  SFA laws in schools: Level 2 Enrolled and state level smoke-free air laws in school are at level 2, indicator 0.08 0.28 
  SFA laws in schools: Level 3 Enrolled and state level smoke-free air laws in school are at level 3, indicator 0.18 0.38 
  SFA laws in schools: Level 4 Enrolled and state level smoke-free air laws in school are at level 4, indicator 0.02 0.14 
  SFA laws in schools: Level 5 Enrolled and state level smoke-free air laws in school are at level 5, indicator 0.05 0.21 
  SFA laws in public transit level of smoke-free air laws in public transit (Level: 0-5) 1.85 1.54 
  SFA laws in healthcare   facilities level of smoke-free air laws in health care facilities (Level: 0-4) 1.61 1.28 
  SFA laws in recreational facilities level of smoke-free air laws in recreational facilities (Level: 0-5) 1.67 1.7 
  SFA laws in cultural facilities level of smoke-free air laws in cultural facilities (Level: 0-5) 2.25 1.47 
  SFA laws in child care centers level of smoke-free air laws in child care centers (Level: 0-5) 2.28 1.77 
  SFA laws in restaurants level of smoke-free air laws in restaurants (Level: 0-4) 1.13 1.29 
  SFA laws in shopping malls level of smoke-free air laws in shopping malls (Level: 0-4) 0.94 1.51 
  SFA laws in free-standing bars The state has smoke-free air laws in free-standing bars, indicator 0.37 0.48 
Tobacco control Programs 
  Tobacco control Funding per capita The state level tobacco control funding per capita 2.18 2.61 
  Other tobacco control funding The state level other tobacco control funding 1.75 0.99 
a: the coding scheme of smoke-free air laws is in appendix. SFA-Smoke-free air Laws. 
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Table2-Esitiamtes of Non-addictive Equations 
Dependent Variable Consumption equation Participation equation 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price -33.09*** -17.43* -15.69** -0.039*** -0.011* -0.009+ 
 
(8.481) (9.109) (7.411) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
Youth Access Laws 
      Possession-Use 1.882 -5.858 11.83 -0.004 -0.021 -0.011 
-Purchase Law:1 (19.27) (15.74) (12.42) (0.024) (0.022) (0.016) 
Possession-Use -14.88 -18.00** -14.42** -0.021 -0.008 -0.002 
-Purchase Law:2 (11.23) (8.460) (7.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) 
Possession-Use 14.51 6.606 7.825 -0.009 -0.013 -0.012 
-Purchase Law:3 (15.98) (12.89) (10.92) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) 
 PUP Law:1*  1.69 1.116 -1.815 -0.003 -0.015 -0.018 
    Youth (10.28) (15.18) (15.28) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) 
 PUP Law:2*  4.629 4.026 -1.300 0.001 -0.005 -0.009 
    Youth (9.439) (14.79) (14.50) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
 PUP Law:3*  8.05 -13.00 -14.28 -0.008 -0.027* -0.032** 
    Youth (11.27) (19.02) (18.72) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
        School  Level1 16.07 23.35 -5.844 0.039* 0.064*** 0.022 
 
(19.51) (21.42) (15.80) (0.022) (0.016) (0.013) 
 School Level2 -12.86 17.91 -3.948 0.007 0.052*** 0.024 
 
(15.23) (18.74) (16.13) (0.027) (0.019) (0.015) 
 School Level3 6.466 16.08 -10.80 0.035 0.055*** 0.023 
 
(16.01) (20.50) (15.62) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) 
 School Level4 21.91 -8.672 -39.57* 0.037 -- 0.042* 
 
(23.09) (36.24) (22.98) (0.033) -- (0.023) 
 School Level5 10.50 26.34 8.929 0.039* 0.057*** 0.042*** 
 
(17.13) (15.05) (16.89) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014) 
 School  Level1 
    *enrolled 
3.374 21.6 23.21 0.008 -0.010 -0.007 
(17.05) (15.21) (15.25) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) 
  School Level2 43.92*** 31.61** 33.78** 0.039* -0.0005 0.001 
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      *enrolled (15.42) (12.81) (12.76) (0.020) (0.008) (0.009) 
  School Level3 
     *enrolled 
-10.05 13.34 15.00 -0.018 -0.015* -0.013 
(12.44) (12.47) (12.85) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) 
  School Level4 
     *enrolled 
24.35** 30.95*** 33.89*** 0.019** -0.006 -0.005 
(9.709) (10.57) (10.48) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
  School Level5 
    *enrolled 
32.74* 27.6 30.91* -0.003 -0.016 -0.015 
(18.89) (17.02) (17.20) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) 
  Worksite Level1 10.45 12.18 16.58 -0.029 -0.027** -0.005 
 
(14.64) (16.70) (11.16) (0.019) (0.012) (0.008) 
 Worksite Level2 29.62 26.91 28.99** -0.074*** -0.039** -0.027** 
 
(20.25) (19.22) (12.26) (0.025) (0.018) (0.013) 
 Worksite Level3 18.65 14.12 12.24 -0.052*** -0.029** -0.029 
 
(17.71) (12.60) (10.66) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) 
 Worksite Level1 
   *employed 
7.07 4.822 3.321 -0.002 0.002 0.001 
(9.546) (6.406) (6.510) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) 
  Worksite Level2 -15.62* -0.321 -2.463 -0.012 -0.017** -0.017** 
   *employed (9.155) (5.480) (5.455) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) 
  Worksite Level3 -7.359 14.47* 12.56 -0.004 0.003 0.003 
   *employed (16.62) (8.038) (8.091) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) 
  Public Transit 
 
-1.457 1.827 -0.413 0.007** 0.009** 0.004 
(2.542) (4.012) (2.485) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
  Healthcare facilities 
 
-7.722 -4.762 -2.95 0.017* 0.010 0.005 
(6.656) (6.990) (4.736) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) 
  Recreational facilities 
 
2.686 -4.898 2.144 0.005 -0.006 0.004 
(5.398) (6.089) (4.452) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
  Culture facilities  
 
2.018 2.15 3.122 -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 
(4.364) (8.431) (5.423) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
  Child care centers 
 
2.036 10.87** 1.564 0.006 0.010 -0.000 
(4.494) (4.889) (2.248) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) 
  Free standing Bars 
 
-4.345 -4.659 1.448 -0.012 -0.017 -0.009 
(7.839) (7.619) (5.511) (0.014) (0.010) (0.006) 
   Restaurants -3.145 -7.748 -5.705 -0.007 -0.007 0.002 
  
55 55 55 
Table 2_Continued 
 (5.542) (7.642) (5.062) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) 
  Shopping Malls 
 
4.744 3.153 -0.0517 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(4.940) (5.602) (5.362) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Control Programs 
        Tobacco control Funding  -1.224 -0.986 -0.799 -0.003** -0.002* -0.001 
  per capita (0.806) (1.256) (1.150) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Other tobacco control funding -2.547 -1.512 0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 
(3.964) (4.393) (3.776) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
price elasticity -0.290*** -0.152* -0.137** -0.237*** -0.062* -0.050+ 
 (0.074) (0.079)  (0.064)  (0.070) (0.036)  (0.034) 
Individual Fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Observations 28438 28438 28438 82639 86239 86239 
R-squared 0.156 0.075 0.075 0.112 0.055 0.054 
       Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are controlled for age, age squared, year fixed effects, 
state fixed effects, household structure, youth income, race, gender, marital status, employment status, and 
education level. Standard errors are clustered by states. *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
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Table3          Estimates of  Myopic Model 
Panel A  Estimates of Myopic Model-Participation Equation 
 2SLS OLS 
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Past Participation -2.318 0.738*** 0.771*** 0.630*** 
(6.750) (0.137) (0.101) (0.010) 
  price (Pt) -0.009 -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.016** 
(0.061) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  Possession-Use -0.088 0.032* 0.042*** 0.019 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.245) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) 
  Possession-Use -0.028 0.020** 0.019** 0.010 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.099) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
  Possession-Use -0.068 0.014 0.015 0.002 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.161) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
  School Level1 0.016 -0.041 0.008 0.004 
  *enrolled (0.054) (0.027) (0.008) (0.007) 
  School Level2 0.149 -0.036* 0.006 0.005 
  *enrolled (0.352) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) 
  School Level3 -0.049 -0.050* -0.004 -0.008 
  *enrolled (0.106) (0.028) (0.009) (0.008) 
  School Level4 0.094 -0.039* 0.001 0.002 
  *enrolled (0.214) (0.021) (0.008) (0.006) 
  School Level5 0.030 -0.047* -0.004 -0.006 
  *enrolled (0.089) (0.025) (0.008) (0.007) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 
  *employed (0.030) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.021 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008* 
  *employed (0.043) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.018 0.011 0.010 0.002 
  *employed (0.063) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
  Public transit -0.003 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 
 
(0.025) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
 Healthcare  0.061 0.011 0.012 0.013** 
  facilities (0.113) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
  Recreational  0.029 0.006 0.006 0.003 
   facilities (0.061) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Culture   0.014 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
   facilities (0.076) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Child care  -0.028 0.002 0.001 0.004 
  centers (0.079) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Restaurants -0.037 0.004 0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.092) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 Shopping Malls -0.019 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 
 
(0.053) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Free-standing bar -0.022 -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.029** 
 
(0.040) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Control Programs 
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  Tobacco control  -0.006 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.001 
  Funding/Captita (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Other tobacco  -0.002 0.001 0.0005 -0.002 
  control funding (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 73707 65394 65394 73707 
R-squared 0.12 0.35 
 
0.44 
Price Elasticity         
  Long run -0.017 -0.394* -0.41* -0.245** 
 (0.125) (0.220) (0.248) (0.108) 
  Short run -0.053 -0.10*** -0.094*** -0.091** 
 (0.349) (0.033) (0.032) (0.041) 
Regression-based 
test of 
Endogeneity 
2.03 0.36 1.42 -- 
F-ratio, IV for 
past Participation 
0.19 3.52 4.53 -- 
Score 𝜒2 -- 25.10 13.05 -- 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by 
states, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. For regression-based 
test of endogeneity, critical values of F(1,50) are 4.03 at 5% and 7.17 at 1%. 
For test of instruments, critical values of F(29,50) are 1.69 at 5% and 2.11 at 
1% for model in column2; critical values of F(12,50) are 1.95 at 5% and 
2.56 at 1% for model in colmu3. For test of over identifying restrictions, 
critical values of chi square (28) are 41.34 at 5% and 48.28 at 1% for model 
in column2; critical values of chi square (11) are 19.68 at 5% and 24.72 at 
1% in column3. 
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Table 3 Panel B  Estimates of  Myopic Model- Conditional 
Consumption Equation 
 2SLS OLS 
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Past Consumption  0.816*** 0.549*** 0.754*** 0.545*** 
   (Ct-1) (0.303) (0.164) (0.058) (0.013) 
  Real cigarette price 
(Pt) 
-16.01* -23.25*** -17.12*** -20.87*** 
(8.849) (8.214) (5.686) (6.167) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  PUP Law:1 19.74 -2.008 17.81** 11.26 
   *youth (12.99) (16.17) (8.52) (8.57) 
  Possession-Use 0.0148 -2.351 -0.375 -1.694 
  -Purchase Law:2 (7.671) (7.852) (7.771) (8.003) 
  Possession-Use 7.914 5.687 7.107 4.372 
  -Purchase Law:3 (9.702) (9.155) (8.599) (8.842) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
  School Level1 -6.795 -69.33*** -5.86 -2.691 
 
(9.65) (21.94) (9.64) (10.62) 
 School Level2 5.011 -42.73*** 8.561 20.59* 
 
(18.48) (12.47) (10.46) (10.66) 
 School Level3 -5.195 -70.94*** -4.981 -4.258 
 
(8.85) (22.45) (8.95) (9.29) 
 School Level4 -7.655 -55.66*** -4.643 5.566 
 
(15.03) (12.63) (8.27) (7.53) 
 School Level5 1.002 -50.73*** 3.57 12.27 
 
(13.82) (17.12) (10.85) (12.16) 
 Worksite Level1 2.06 -7.873 2.814 5.371 
 
(10.24) (5.09) (9.40) (8.88) 
 Worksite Level2 -4.532 -18.95*** -4.937 -6.306 
 
(8.334) (5.162) (7.699) (7.705) 
 Worksite Level3 6.942 -11.61 6.035 2.961 
 
(10.66) (10.04) (10.01) (10.18) 
 Public transit -1.976 -2.336 -2.054 -2.315 
 
(3.354) (3.233) (3.204) (2.978) 
 Healthcare 
facilities -1.418 -3.437 -1.777 -2.993 
 
(6.514) (6.016) (6.066) (6.143) 
 Recreational  -2.834 -0.033 -2.162 0.114 
   facilities (5.551) (4.528) (4.089) (4.063) 
  Culture  facilities 4.685 2.995 4.575 4.205 
 
(4.725) (4.287) (4.522) (4.057) 
 Child care centers 5.864 4.666 5.383 3.751 
 
(5.393) (5.360) (4.700) (4.998) 
 Restaurants -7.071 -4.962 -6.636 -5.163 
 
(9.042) (9.901) (8.777) (9.473) 
 Shopping  Malls -0.792 -0.562 -0.88 -1.178 
 
(4.740) (5.029) (4.686) (4.762) 
 Free-standing bar -0.656 -0.809 -0.591 -0.37 
 
(5.752) (5.731) (5.730) (5.740) 
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Table 3 Panel B  Continued 
Control Programs 
      Tobacco control  0.25 -0.153 0.131 -0.272 
  Funding per capita (0.786) (0.665) (0.567) (0.563) 
  Other tobacco  3.304 1.204 2.791 1.054 
  control funding (2.926) (3.216) (2.875) (3.205) 
Observations 25271 25271 25271 25271 
R-squared 0.321 0.37 0.343 0.376 
Price Elasticity         
  Long run -0.758 -0.449*** -0.607*** -0.400*** 
 (0.942) (0.149) (0.216) (0.119) 
  Short run -0.140* -0.203*** -0.149*** -0.182*** 
 (0.077) (0.07) (0.050) (0.054) 
Regression-based 
test of Endogeneity 
0.90 0.004 15.61 -- 
F-ratio, IV for past 
consumption 
9.09 4.05 57.88 -- 
Score 𝜒2 -- 10.06 47.00 -- 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by states, 
*0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01For regression-based test of 
endogeneity, critical values of F(1,50) are 4.03 at 5% and 7.17 at 1%. For test 
of instruments, critical values of F(15,50) are 1.87 at 5% and 2.42 at 1% for 
model in column2; critical values of F(35,50) are 1.66 at 5% and 2.05 at 1% 
for model in colmu3. For test of over identifying restrictions, critical values 
of chi square (14) are 23.69 at 5% and 29.14 at 1% for model in column2; 
critical values of chi square (34) are 48.60 at 5% and 56.06 at 1% in 
column3. 
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Table4- Estimates of Rational Addiction Model                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Panel A  participation equation 
 2SLS OLS 
Independent  
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Future Participation -0.752 0.399*** 0.599*** 0.429*** 
(1.798) (0.123) (0.104) (0.005) 
  Past Participation 0.201 0.199* 0.296*** 0.380*** 
(0.956) (0.109) (0.107) (0.004) 
  Real cigarette price -0.003 -0.010* -0.011** -0.009* 
(0.036) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  PUP Law:1 0.032 -0.02 -0.012 -0.002 
  *youth (0.093) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) 
  PUP Law:2 0.012 0.005 0.002 0.006 
  *youth (0.029) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
  PUP Law:3 0.0005 -0.012 -0.015* -0.009 
  *youth (0.040) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
  School Level1 0.027 -0.074*** -0.005 -0.001 
     *enrolled (0.052) (0.025) (0.007) (0.005) 
  School Level2 0.093 -0.061*** -0.015** -0.004 
     *enrolled (0.155) (0.018) (0.008) (0.006) 
  School Level3 -0.005 -0.082*** -0.009 -0.007 
     *enrolled (0.028) (0.026) (0.006) (0.006) 
  School Level4 0.061 -0.057*** -0.004 9.42E-05 
     *enrolled (0.091) (0.019) (0.006) (0.004) 
  School Level5 0.038 -0.069*** -0.010 -0.005 
     *enrolled (0.071) (0.020) (0.006) (0.004) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.021 -0.006 0.003 -0.002 
  *employed (0.041) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.011 -0.003 0.001 -0.0004 
  *employed (0.022) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Worksite Level3 0.002 0.006 0.014 0.011 
  *employed (0.028) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
  Public transit 0.016 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
 Healthcare  0.032 0.010 0.005 0.006 
   facilities (0.042) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
  Recreational  0.015 -0.004 -0.008* -0.007* 
   facilities (0.033) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
  Culture facilities  -0.014 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 
 
(0.019) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
 Child care centers -0.008 0.005 0.008 0.006 
 
(0.030) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
 Restaurants -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.023) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
 Shopping Malls -0.012 0.001 0.005 0.003 
 
(0.024) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
 Free-standing bar -0.053 -0.014 -0.008 -0.016 
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Table 4 Panel A Continued 
 
(0.063) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Control Programs 
      Tobacco control  -0.003 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  Funding per capita (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Other tobacco  -0.0005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  control funding (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 61711 61711 61711 63066 
R-squared -- 0.517 0.517 0.555 
Price Elasticity     
  Long run -0.005 -0.148 -0.612 -0.277* 
 (0.051) (0.106) (0.528) (0.139) 
  Short run -0.018 -0.060* -0.06** -0.053** 
 (0.021) (0.035) (0.028) (0.028) 
Regression-based 
test of Endogeneity 
1.91 1.72 1.36 -- 
F-ratio, IV for past 
participation 
1.01 5.19 8.27 -- 
F-ratio, IV for 
Future 
participation 
0.40 6.84 36.97 -- 
Score 𝜒2 -- 23.68 36.96 -- 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by 
states, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. For regression-
based test of endogeneity, critical values of F(2,50) are 3.18 at 5% and 5.06 
at 1%. For test of instruments, critical values of F(30,50) are 1.69 at 5% 
and 2.10 at 1% for model in column2; critical values of F(32,50) are 1.67 at 
5% and 2.08 at 1% for model in colmu3. For test of over identifying 
restrictions, critical values of chi square (28) are 41.34 at 5% and 48.28 at 
1% for model in column2; critical values of chi square (30) are 43.77 at 5% 
and 50.89 at 1% in column3. 
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Table 4 Panel B Conditional Consumption Equation  
 2SLS OLS 
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Past Consumption 1.71 0.387** 0.304** 0.366*** 
(1.366) (0.164) (0.120) (0.008) 
  Future Consumption -0.706 0.313* 0.225* 0.356*** 
(0.973) (0.161) (0.115) (0.009) 
  Real cigarette price -25.81 -10.81 -16.33** -12.33* 
(20.08) (10.29) (8.212) (6.758) 
Minimum Age Laws 
      PUP Law:1 77.83 -8.08 2.087 -1.416 
   *youth (70.49) (16.19) (8.114) (8.298) 
  PUP Law:2 23.3 -3.739 -3.622 -4.384 
   *youth (26.11) (7.599) (7.060) (7.892) 
  PUP Law:3 38.74 -5.504 -5.495 -6.783 
   *youth (38.73) (8.815) (7.409) (7.761) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
      School Level1 -10.94 -47.80** 2.531 0.007 
   *enrolled (17.91) (18.72) (10.45) (8.513) 
  School Level2 -7.828 -34.03*** 23.44** 11.76 
   *enrolled (42.23) (12.12) (11.51) (9.001) 
  School Level3 -1.066 -54.33*** -3.618 -5.371 
   *enrolled (20.42) (18.66) (8.122) (7.948) 
  School Level4 -27.39 -33.29** 14.58* 8.682 
   *enrolled (40.48) (13.65) (8.156) (7.210) 
  School Level5 14.25 -39.67*** 14.9 4.459 
 
(30.15) (15.37) (12.09) (10.20) 
 Worksite Level1 -8.856 -3.248 -0.717 -1.961 
  *employed (21.09) (4.465) (8.677) (6.903) 
  Worksite Level2 1.444 -11.65* -13.81* -12.86 
  *employed (21.15) (6.057) (7.766) (7.778) 
  Worksite Level3 18.79 4.681 9.255 9.845  
  *employed (24.46) (11.48) (10.76) (9.796) 
  Public transit 1.438 -19.36 -6.157** -7.412*** 
 
(10.94) (16.34) (2.739) (2.519) 
 Healthcare facilities 4.582 -4.569 0.927 -0.107 
 
(22.01) (7.181) (6.730) (5.620) 
 Recreational facilities -22.13 6.825 8.191 6.699 
 
(28.86) (6.291) (5.421) (4.137) 
 Culture  facilities 19.39 1.663 -2.192 -1.812 
 
(22.30) (6.352) (5.487) (3.938) 
 Child care centers 21.18 -2.098 4.02 6.334 
 
(18.51) (12.53) (5.486) (5.155) 
 Restaurants 2.354 -11.51 -6.638 -7.265 
 
(15.62) (20.30) (5.231) (4.598) 
 Shopping  Malls -16.16 6.351 -3.131 -1.741 
 
(20.10) (14.73) (6.767) (5.612) 
 Free-standing bar -40.41 26.23** -4.517 -5.858 
 
(38.54) (10.89) (15.28) (16.87) 
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Table 4 Panel B Continued 
Control Programs 
      Tobacco control  1.058 0.042 -0.437 -0.24 
  Funding per capita (2.108) (0.624) (0.684) (0.558) 
  Other tobacco  12.36 0.505 0.527 1.586 
  control funding (12.78) (2.677) (3.188) (2.863) 
Observations 20716 18465 20716 21296 
R-squared -- 0.454 0.441 0.464 
Price Elasticity     
  Long run -- -0.317 -0.304** -0.390** 
 -- (0.251) (0.135) (0.214) 
  Short run -0.227 -0.096 -0.144** -0.108* 
 (0.177) (0.091) (0.072) (0.059) 
Regression-based test of 
Endogeneity 
2.32 0.05 1.46 -- 
F-ratio, IV for past 
consumption 
2.60 5.36 17.14 -- 
F-ratio, IV for Future 
consumption 
3.81 7.16 15.54 -- 
Score 𝜒2 -- 20.15 30.55 -- 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by 
states, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. For regression-
based test of endogeneity, critical values of F(2,50) are 3.18 at 5% and 
5.06 at 1%. For test of instruments, critical values of F(30,50) are 1.69 at 
5% and 2.10 at 1% for model in column2; critical values of F(35,50) are 
1.66 at 5% and 2.08=5 at 1% for model in colmu3. For test of over 
identifying restrictions, critical values of chi square (28) are 41.34 at 5% 
and 48.28 at 1% for model in column2; critical values of chi square (33) 
are 47.40 at 5% and 54.78 at 1% in column3. 
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Table5B- Transition Matrix of Smoking Intensity 
(number and percentage) 
Baseline 
State t Destination state t+1 
  percentage None light  heavy  Total 
none 50087 4492 475 55054 
 
90.98% 8.16% 0.86% 100% 
light 6118 14890 1499 22570 
 
27.18% 66.16% 6.66% 100% 
heavy 609 1997 4353 6959 
 
8.75% 28.70% 62.55% 100% 
Transition Matrix of Smoking Frequency 
Baseline 
State t Destination state t+1 
 Percentage none intermittent  daily  Total 
None 49085 3806 1430 54321 
 
90.36% 7.01% 2.63% 100% 
intermittent  4795 6616 1811 13222 
 
36.27% 50.04% 13.70% 100% 
Daily 2104 2550 12473 17127 
 
12.28% 14.89% 72.83% 100% 
 
 
Table5-Summary of Smoking States in Two Consecutive 
Periods 
Baseline State t Destination state t+1 
  percentage None light  heavy  Total N 
None 59.26 5.31 0.56 65.14 55054 
Light 7.24 17.62 1.77 26.63 22570 
Heavy 0.72 2.36 5.15 8.23 6959 
Total 67.22 25.29 7.48 100 84520 
Note: allow for repeat transitions 
  Baseline State t Destination state t+1 
  Percentage none intermittent  daily  Total N 
None 57.97 4.50 1.69 64.16 54321 
intermittent  5.66 7.81 2.14 15.61 13222 
Daily 2.48 3.01 14.73 20.22 17127 
Total 66.11 15.32 18.56 100 84670 
Note: allow for repeat transitions 
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Table6- Estimates of First Cigarette Smoking Initiation 
(Progressive Transition)  
Dependent 
variable  
Initiation  
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Annual price (Pt) -0.002 -- -0.008 
(0.009) -- (0.011) 
  Annual Price 
change(Pt-Pt-1) 
-- 0.004 -- 
-- (0.009) -- 
  Annual Past  -- -- -0.006 
   Price (Pt-1) -- -- (0.014) 
 Annual  Future  -- -- 0.007 
   Price (Pt+1) -- -- (0.010) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  Possession-Use 0.025** 0.025** 0.027* 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) 
  Possession-Use 0.007 0.008 0.006 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
  Possession-Use 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
  PUP Law:1 0.002 0.001 0.002 
      *youth (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
  PUP Law:2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
      *youth (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
  PUP Law: 3 -0.012** -0.012** -0.013** 
      *youth (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
   School Level1 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) 
 School Level2 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
 School Level3 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
 School Level4 0.030 0.029 0.049 
 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.035) 
 School Level5 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.056*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
 School Level1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0001 
    *enrolled (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
  School Level2 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
    *enrolled (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
  School Level3 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
     *enrolled (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
  School Level4 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 
     *enrolled (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
  School Level5 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 
     *enrolled  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.011 -0.011 -0.026* 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.024 -0.025 -0.049*** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.011 -0.011 -0.030* 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) 
  Worksite Level1 0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0002 
     *employed  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
  Worksite Level2 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
     *employed (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
  Worksite Level3 0.006 0.006 0.010 
     *employed (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
  Public transit 0.005 0.005 0.016*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Healthcare 
facilities 0.008 0.008 0.014** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
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  Recreational  -0.002 -0.002 0.0002 
   facilities (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
  Culture facilities -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.016*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Child care centers 0.004 0.004 0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
  Restaurants -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
  Shopping  Malls 0.005 0.006 -0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
  Free-standing bar -0.014* -0.013* -0.017** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Control Programs 
     Tobacco control  
  Funding per capita 
-0.001** -0.001** -0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Other tobacco  
  control funding 
-0.004* -0.005** -0.004* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observations 35427 35427 32787 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by 
states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, 
***p ≤ 0.01. 
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Table6B- Estimates of Intermittent Smoking Initiation 
(Progressive Transition)  
Dependent variable  Initiation  
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Annual price (Pt) -0.004 -- -0.008 
(0.004) -- (0.006) 
  Annual Price 
change(Pt-Pt-1) 
-- -0.001 -- 
-- (0.001) -- 
  Annual Past  -- -- -0.003 
   Price (Pt-1) -- -- (0.003) 
 Annual  Future  -- -- 0.003 
   Price (Pt+1) -- -- (0.002) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  Possession-Use 0.0002 0.001 0.0002 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  Possession-Use -0.001 0.0003 -0.0003 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Possession-Use -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  PUP Law:1 0.002 0.002 0.003 
      *youth (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  PUP Law:2 0.001 0.001 0.002 
      *youth (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  PUP Law: 3 0.0004 -0.0001 0.001 
      *youth (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
   School Level1 0.002 0.002 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
 School Level2 0.0002 -0.0002 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
 School Level3 0.002 0.003 0.005 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
  School Level4 -0.007 -0.008 -- 
 
(0.006) (0.007) -- 
 School Level5 0.003 0.003 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
 School Level1 0.002+ 0.002* 0.003** 
    *enrolled (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  School Level2 0.001 0.001 0.001 
    *enrolled (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  School Level3 0.001 0.001 0.002 
     *enrolled (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  School Level4 0.002 0.002 0.003* 
     *enrolled (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
  School Level5 0.001 0.001 0.001 
     *enrolled  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Worksite Level1 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
  Worksite Level2 0.001 0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* 
     *employed  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.003* -0.003* -0.004** 
     *employed (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Worksite Level3 0.001 0.001 0.002 
     *employed (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Public transit 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Healthcare facilities 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Recreational  -0.003** -0.003 -0.004 
   facilities (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
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  Culture facilities 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Child care centers 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Restaurants -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Shopping  Malls 0.0004 0.0003 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Free-standing bar -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Control Programs 
     Tobacco control  
  Funding per capita 
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
  Other tobacco  
  control funding 
0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Observations 57801 57801 53121 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by 
states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p 
≤ 0.01. 
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Table6C- Estimates of Daily Smoking Initiation 
(Progressive Transition)  
Dependent variable  Initiation  
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Annual price (Pt) -0.003 -- -0.006 
(0.003) -- (0.005) 
  Annual Price 
change(Pt-Pt-1) 
-- -0.001 -- 
-- (0.001) -- 
  Annual Past  -- -- -0.0004 
   Price (Pt-1) -- -- (0.002) 
 Annual  Future  -- -- 0.002 
   Price (Pt+1) -- -- (0.002) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  Possession-Use 0.002 0.002 0.003 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Possession-Use -0.0003 0.001 0.002* 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Possession-Use -0.001 0.0004 0.001 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  PUP Law:1 0.001 0.0004 0.001 
      *youth (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  PUP Law:2 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 
      *youth (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) 
  PUP Law: 3 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
      *youth (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
   School Level1 0.005 0.005 0.007 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
 School Level2 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
 School Level3 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
  School Level4 -- -0.002 -0.004 
 
-- (0.003) (0.005) 
 School Level5 0.003 0.003 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
 School Level1 0.001 0.001 0.001 
    *enrolled (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  School Level2 0.000 0.00005 0.000 
    *enrolled (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  School Level3 0.0002 0.0003 -0.001 
     *enrolled (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  School Level4 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.001 
     *enrolled (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  School Level5 0.001 0.001 0.002 
     *enrolled  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
  Worksite Level1 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 
     *employed  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
     *employed (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Worksite Level3 0.002 0.001 0.003 
     *employed (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  Public transit 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Healthcare facilities 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Recreational  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
   facilities (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
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  Culture facilities 0.0004 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Child care centers 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Restaurants -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Shopping  Malls 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Free-standing bar -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Control Programs 
     Tobacco control  
  Funding per capita 
-0.00002 -0.00002 -0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
  Other tobacco  
  control funding 
0.0001 -0.000 0.0002 
(0.002) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Observations 62120 62120 56930 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by 
states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p 
≤ 0.01. 
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Table6D- Estimates of Five Cigarettes per Day Smoking 
Initiation (Progressive Transition)  
Dependent variable  Initiation  
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Annual price (Pt) -0.005+ -- -0.006 
(0.004) -- (0.006) 
  Annual Price 
change(Pt-Pt-1) 
-- -0.001 -- 
-- (0.002) -- 
  Annual Past  -- -- -0.001 
   Price (Pt-1) -- -- (0.003) 
 Annual  Future  -- -- -0.001 
   Price (Pt+1) -- -- (0.003) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  Possession-Use 0.003 0.004 0.003 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
  Possession-Use 0.001 0.002 0.001 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Possession-Use -0.00003 -0.000 0.0002 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  PUP Law:1 0.001 0.0002 0.001 
      *youth (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  PUP Law:2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
      *youth (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  PUP Law: 3 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
      *youth (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
   School Level1 0.002 0.002 -0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
 School Level2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.013* 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
 School Level3 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011* 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
  School Level4 -- -0.012 -0.025** 
 
-- (0.008) (0.012) 
 School Level5 0.0003 0.0003 -0.007 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
 School Level1 0.003* 0.003* 0.005** 
    *enrolled (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  School Level2 0.003* 0.003* 0.004** 
    *enrolled (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  School Level3 0.002 0.002 0.002 
     *enrolled (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  School Level4 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 
     *enrolled (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  School Level5 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
     *enrolled  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  Worksite Level1 0.002 0.002 0.011 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
  Worksite Level2 0.002 0.002 0.014 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
     *employed  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.003* -0.003** -0.005** 
     *employed (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0003 
     *employed (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Public transit 0.0003 0.0002 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Healthcare facilities 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Recreational  -0.003* -0.003* -0.004** 
   facilities (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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  Culture facilities 0.002* 0.003** 0.004** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Child care centers 0.002 0.002 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  Restaurants -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Shopping  Malls 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  Free-standing bar -0.007* -0.006* -0.007 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Control Programs 
     Tobacco control  
  Funding per capita 
-0.00005 -0.00005 -0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
  Other tobacco  
  control funding 
-0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 62106 62106 56944 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by 
states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p 
≤ 0.01. 
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Table6E- Estimates of Ten Cigarettes per Day Smoking 
Initiation (Progressive Transition)  
Dependent variable  Initiation  
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Annual price (Pt) -0.002 -- -0.006 
(0.003) -- (0.005) 
  Annual Price 
change(Pt-Pt-1) 
-- 0.001 -- 
-- (0.002) -- 
  Annual Past  -- -- -0.003 
   Price (Pt-1) -- -- (0.003) 
 Annual  Future  -- -- 0.006 
   Price (Pt+1) -- -- (0.004) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  Possession-Use -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Possession-Use -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0001 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Possession-Use -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  PUP Law:1 0.003 0.003 0.004 
      *youth (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  PUP Law:2 0.001 0.001 0.001 
      *youth (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  PUP Law: 3 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
      *youth (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
   School Level1 0.005 0.005 0.007 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
 School Level2 0.002 0.001 0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) 
 School Level3 0.0002 0.006 0.007 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) 
  School Level4 -0.004 0.002 -- 
 
(0.002) (0.006) -- 
 School Level5 0.001 0.005 0.006 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) 
 School Level1 0.001 0.001 0.001 
    *enrolled (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  School Level2 0.002 0.002 0.002 
    *enrolled (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  School Level3 0.0002 0.0003 0.001 
     *enrolled (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  School Level4 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004* 
     *enrolled (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  School Level5 0.001 0.001 0.001 
     *enrolled  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
     *employed  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
     *employed (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
     *employed (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  Public transit -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Healthcare facilities 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Recreational  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
   facilities (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
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  Culture facilities 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Child care centers -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Restaurants -0.0003 -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Shopping  Malls -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Free-standing bar -0.002 -0.002 -0.005* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Control Programs 
     Tobacco control  
  Funding per capita 
-0.00004 -0.00004 -0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
  Other tobacco  
  control funding 
0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 68172 68172 62219 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by 
states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p 
≤ 0.01. 
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Table6F- Estimates of Fifteen Cigarettes per Day Smoking 
Initiation (Progressive Transition)  
Dependent variable  Initiation  
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Annual price (Pt) -0.002 -- -0.016* 
(0.002) -- (0.009) 
  Annual Price 
change(Pt-Pt-1) 
-- -0.004 -- 
-- (0.006) -- 
  Annual Past  -- -- 0.003 
   Price (Pt-1) -- -- (0.008) 
 Annual  Future  -- -- 0.006 
   Price (Pt+1) -- -- (0.004) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  Possession-Use -0.005 0.002 0.001 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) 
  Possession-Use -0.002 0.004 0.005 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
  Possession-Use 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
  PUP Law:1 0.003 0.006 0.009 
      *youth (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) 
  PUP Law:2 0.002 0.002 0.004 
      *youth (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
  PUP Law: 3 0.001 -0.001** -0.0001 
      *youth (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
   School Level1 0.013** 0.004 0.010 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) 
 School Level2 0.008* 0.002 0.010 
 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.014) 
 School Level3 0.011** 0.008 0.015 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.011) 
  School Level4 0.011* -0.019 -0.019 
 
(0.006) (0.019) (0.024) 
 School Level5 0.009** -0.002 0.014 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.012) 
 School Level1 -0.001 0.006** 0.009** 
    *enrolled (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
  School Level2 -0.003 0.004 0.005 
    *enrolled (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
  School Level3 -0.0005 0.004 0.006 
     *enrolled (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
  School Level4 0.001 0.009*** 0.012*** 
     *enrolled (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
  School Level5 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
     *enrolled  (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.007* -0.001 -0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.012) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.012* -0.003 -0.006 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.009* -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.0001 -0.003 -0.004 
     *employed  (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
  Worksite Level2 -0.000 -0.006*** -0.008** 
     *employed (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  Worksite Level3 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
     *employed (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
  Public transit 0.0004 0.003 0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Healthcare facilities 0.0003 -0.0004 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
  Recreational  -0.001 -0.010** -0.011** 
   facilities (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
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  Culture facilities -0.0002 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Child care centers 0.002 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Restaurants 0.0002 -0.006** -0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Shopping  Malls 0.001 0.006** 0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
  Free-standing bar -0.005*** -0.008 -0.011 
 
(0.002) (0.007) (0.010) 
Control Programs 
     Tobacco control  
  Funding per capita 
-0.0002 -0.001 -0.001** 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
  Other tobacco  
  control funding 
-0.00003 -0.002** -0.002* 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 73244 73244 66587 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by 
states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p 
≤ 0.01. 
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Table7- Estimates of Smoking Restarting  
(Progressive Transition) 
Dependent 
variable 
Restart   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
   Price (Pt) -0.021 -- -0.027 
(0.021) -- (0.030) 
   Price change  -- -0.027 -- 
      (Pt-Pt-1) -- (0.025) -- 
   Past Price  -- -- 0.003 
      (Pt-1) -- -- (0.037) 
   Future  Price  
      (Pt+1) 
-- -- 0.005 
-- -- (0.026) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  Possession-Use -0.041 -0.038 -0.122** 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.073) (0.072) (0.061) 
  Possession-Use -0.057 -0.052 -0.056 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.051) (0.047) (0.054) 
  Possession-Use 0.006 -0.001 -0.025 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.056) (0.049) (0.060) 
  PUP Law:1 0.025 0.023 0.051 
      *youth (0.063) (0.063) (0.068) 
  PUP Law:2 0.054 0.052 0.069 
      *youth (0.047) (0.047) (0.052) 
  PUP Law: 3 0.001 -0.001 0.009 
      *youth (0.048) (0.049) (0.053) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
  School Level1 0.061 0.060 0.048 
 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.080) 
 School Level2 0.082 0.078 0.110 
 
(0.062) (0.063) (0.085) 
 School Level3 0.046 0.047 0.089 
 
(0.060) (0.059) (0.081) 
 School Level4 0.100 0.089 -- 
 
(0.101) (0.100) -- 
 School Level5 0.055 0.055 0.117 
 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.083) 
 School Level1 0.045 0.045 0.054* 
    *enrolled (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
  School Level2 0.008 0.007 0.009 
    *enrolled (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) 
  School Level3 0.014 0.014 0.016 
     *enrolled (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) 
  School Level4 -0.027 -0.027 -0.043* 
     *enrolled (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) 
  School Level5 -0.050* -0.050* -0.052 
     *enrolled  (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) 
  Worksite Level1 0.019 0.017 0.026 
 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.075) 
 Worksite Level2 -0.167 -0.164 -0.102 
 
(0.109) (0.108) (0.129) 
 Worksite Level3 -0.079 -0.076 -0.045 
 
(0.081) (0.082) (0.086) 
 Worksite Level1 -0.022 -0.024 -0.035 
     *employed  (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) 
  Worksite Level2 0.008 0.008 -0.003 
     *employed (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) 
  Worksite Level3 0.004 0.004 0.022 
     *employed (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) 
  Public Transit 0.011 0.010 0.012 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021) 
 Healthcare  0.014 0.014 -0.002 
     facilities (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) 
  Recreational  0.005 0.005 -0.006 
    Facilities (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
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  Culture facilities -0.020 -0.018 0.005 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.017) 
 Child care centers 0.003 -0.0003 -0.001 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.025) 
 Restaurants 0.026 0.025 0.054*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
 Shopping Malls -0.005 -0.007 -0.035 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) 
 Free-standing bar -0.055** -0.049** -0.110*** 
 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.043) 
Control Programs 
     Tobacco control  
   Funding/capita 
0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Other tobacco  
  control funding 
0.010 0.009 0.014 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Observations 11159 11159 9399 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by 
states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, 
***p ≤ 0.01,+ p<0.1 in one tailed  test. 
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Table 7B- Estimates of Smoking Transition from Nonsmoking (Progressive Transition)   
Dependent variable Competing Risk Model   
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Intermittent        Daily  Intermittent           Daily Intermittent          Daily  Intermittent Daily 
  Price (Pt) 0.006 -0.001 -- -- -- -- 0.007 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.001) -- -- -- -- (0.005) (0.002) 
  Price change(Pt-Pt-1) 
  
-0.008+ 0.0003 0.002 -0.001 -- -- 
  
(0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) -- -- 
  Past Price (Pt-1) -- -- -- -- 0.014** -0.003 -- -- 
-- -- -- -- (0.006) (0.003) -- -- 
  Future Price (Pt+1) -- -- -- -- 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 
-- -- -- -- (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) 
Minimum Age Laws   
  Possession-Use 0.004 0.0001 0.002 0.0002 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.015) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) 
  Possession-Use 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.002 -0.0001 0.005 0.0001 0.004 0.0002 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) 
  Possession-Use -0.007 0.001 -0.007 0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.011 0.001 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.013) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) 
  PUP Law:1 
    *youth 
0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) 
  PUP Law:2 
    *youth 
-0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
     PUP Law:3 
    *youth  
-0.007 -0.0003 -0.005 -0.0004 -0.007 0.0001 -0.007 0.0001 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
Smoke-free Air Laws   
  School Level1 0.026* 0.001 0.026* 0.001 0.028* 0.003 0.029* 0.003 
 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) 
 School Level2 0.026* -0.0002 0.027* -0.0003 0.037** 0.002 0.038** 0.002 
 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) 
 School Level3 0.020 0.001 0.020 0.001 0.029 0.005 0.028 0.005 
 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) 
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  School Level4 -- -- 0.010 -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.010 -0.002 
 
-- -- (0.022) (0.003) (0.025) (0.003) (0.024) (0.003) 
 School Level5 0.018 0.002 0.019 0.002 0.025 0.005 0.025 0.005 
 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) 
 School Level1 
    *enrolled 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) 
  School Level2 
    *enrolled 
-0.008 0.0004 -0.008 0.0004 -0.008 0.0005 -0.008 0.001 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
  School Level3 
    *enrolled 
0.010 -0.001 0.010 -0.0004 0.011 -0.0003 0.011 -0.0003 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) 
  School Level4 
    *enrolled 
0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.0005 -0.002 0.0004 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
  School Level5 
    *enrolled 
-0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) 
Worksite Level1 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.011 0.001 -0.011 0.001 
 
(0.012) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) 
Worksite Level2 -0.042** 0.002 -0.039** 0.001 -0.051** 0.002 -0.055** 0.002 
 
(0.019) (0.002) (0.020) (0.002) (0.024) (0.003) (0.023) (0.003) 
Worksite Level3 -0.012 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001 -0.014 -0.002 -0.015 -0.002 
 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) 
 Worksite Level1 
    *employed 
-0.005 -0.0004 -0.004 -0.0005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
  Worksite Level2 0.009*** -0.001 0.009** -0.001 0.007* -0.001 0.007* -0.001 
    *employed (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.002 -0.0004 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 
     *employed (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
  Public transit 
 
0.004 0.0001 0.004 0.0001 0.008** 0.0003 0.008** 0.0003 
(0.003) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.0005) (0.003) (0.0005) 
  Healthcare facilities 
 
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) 
  Recreational facilities 
 
0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
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  Culture facilities  -0.010*** 0.0003 -0.011*** 0.0003 -0.007* 0.001 -0.008** 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
 Child care centers 
 
0.004 0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
  Restaurants 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
  Shopping  Malls 
 
0.005 -0.0001 0.004 -0.0001 -0.003 0.00002 -0.002 -0.0001 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
  Free-standing bar 
 
-0.015*** -0.002 -0.017*** -0.002 -0.025*** -0.003 -0.026*** -0.003 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) 
Control Programs 
      
  
  Tobacco control Funding 
per capita 
-0.001** -0.0001 -0.001* -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0001 
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001) 
  Other tobacco control 
funding 
-0.002 -0.00001 -0.002 -0.00003 -0.001 0.00004 -0.001 -0.00003 
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.00004) (0.002) (0.0004) 
Observations 55786 55786 55786 55786 50637 50637 50637 50637 
Log Likelihood 
     
  
 Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01 
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Table 7C- Estimates of Smoking Transition from Nonsmoking 
(Progressive Transition) Competing Risk Model 
Independent  
variable 
(1) (3) (5) (7) 
 Light        Light           Light          Light 
  Price (Pt) 0.002 -- -- 0.003 
(0.004) -- -- (0.006) 
  Price change -- -0.004 0.001 -- 
     (Pt-Pt-1) -- (0.006) (0.008) -- 
  Past Price (Pt-1) -- -- 0.006 -- 
-- -- (0.007) -- 
  Future Price 
(Pt+1) 
-- -- 0.002 0.002 
-- -- (0.007) (0.007) 
Minimum Age Laws 
  PUP Law:1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
  PUP Law:2 -0.005 -0.006 -0.0002 -0.001 
        (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
  PUP Law:3 -0.009 -0.009 -0.018 -0.018 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
  PUP Law:1 
    *youth 
0.010 0.011 0.015 0.015 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
  PUP Law:2 
    *youth 
0.0002 0.001 0.004 0.004 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
  PUP Law:3 
    *youth 
-0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
  School Level1 0.025* 0.025* 0.038** 0.038** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
 School Level2 0.022 0.022 0.047*** 0.048*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
 School Level3 0.023 0.023 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
  School Level4 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.006 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
 School Level5 0.023 0.024* 0.039** 0.039*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
 School Level1 
    *enrolled 
0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
  School Level2 
    *enrolled 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
  School Level3 
    *enrolled 
0.010 0.009 0.011 0.011 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
  School Level4 
    *enrolled 
0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
  School Level5 
    *enrolled 
-0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
  Worksite Level1 0.006 0.006 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
 Worksite Level2 -0.028 -0.027 -0.037 -0.039 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) 
 Worksite Level3 -0.012 -0.012 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
  Worksite Level1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 
  *employed (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
  Worksite Level2 0.002 0.002 -0.0001 0.0001 
   *employed (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.006 
   *employed (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
  Public transit 
 
0.006* 0.006* 0.011*** 0.011*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
  Healthcare  0.007 0.007 0.012 0.012 
     facilities (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
  Recreational  
    Facilities 
0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Culture facilities  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007* -0.008* 
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(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Child care  
    centers 
0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
  Restaurants 0.002 0.002 -0.009* 0.005 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
  Shopping  Malls 
 
0.0003 -0.0001 -0.010* -0.009* 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
  Free-standing  
   bar 
-0.022*** -0.023*** -0.036*** -0.037*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 
Control Programs 
  Tobacco control 
Funding/capita 
-0.001** -0.001** -0.002* -0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Other tobacco 
control funding 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 55649 55649 51459 51459 
Log Likelihood 
  
 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by states in 
parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. The 
effects of the determinants on smoking transition from nonsmoking to 
heavy smoking are negligible and not reported in the table. 
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Table8- Estimates of Smoking Cessation (Regressive transition) 
Dependent 
variable 
Quitting   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Price (Pt) 
 
0.031*** -- -- 0.039*** 
(0.007) -- -- (0.011) 
  Price change  -- 0.023*** 0.043*** -- 
      (Pt-Pt-1) -- (0.009) (0.012) -- 
   Past Price  
      (Pt-1) 
-- -- 0.034** -- 
-- -- (0.014) -- 
  Future  Price  -- -- -0.011 -0.012 
      (Pt+1) -- -- (0.011) (0.011) 
 Consumption  -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
    at  baseline (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Smoke-free Air Laws  
  PUP Law:1 -0.015 -0.020 -0.008 -0.008 
 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) 
 PUP Law:2 -0.004 -0.011 -0.001 -0.0003 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
  PUP Law:3 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
 PUP Law:1 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.002 
   *youth (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
  PUP Law:2 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.013 
   *youth (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
  PUP Law:3 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.009 
   *youth (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Smoke-free Air Laws  
  School L1 -0.015 -0.016 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 School L2 -0.032 -0.026 -0.018 -0.019 
 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) 
  School L3 -0.027 -0.029* -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
 School L4 -0.014 0.005 -0.0004 -0.002 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.031) (0.030) 
 School L5 -0.033 -0.030* -0.019 -0.020 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
 School L1 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 
    *enrolled (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
  School L2 -0.006 -0.004 -0.014 -0.014 
    *enrolled (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
  School L3 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
    *enrolled (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) 
  School L4 -0.048*** -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.051*** 
    *enrolled (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
  School L5 -0.016 -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 
    *enrolled (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
  Worksite L1 0.013 0.014 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
 Worksite L2 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.020 
 
(0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) 
 Worksite L3 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.014 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 Worksite L1 0.013 0.015 0.010 0.010 
    *employed (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
  Worksite L2 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.023** 0.023** 
    *employed (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
  Worksite L3 -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 
    *employed (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
  Public transit 0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.006 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
  Healthcare  -0.013 -0.013 -0.002 -0.002 
   facilities (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
  Recreational  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
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   facilities (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
  Culture  0.003 0.0001 0.001 0.001 
   facilities (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
  Child care  0.0005 0.004 0.002 0.002 
    centers (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
  Restaurants 0.005 0.007 -0.004 -0.005 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
 Shopping  0.010 0.011* 0.008 0.008 
    Malls (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
 Free-standing  0.021 0.013 0.028 0.028 
    bar (0.016) (0.012) (0.030) (0.031) 
Tobacco Control Programs 
Funding 
/capita 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Other  
  funding 
-0.00001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Observations 27162 27162 23975 23975 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by states in 
parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
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Table9- Estimates of Smoking Transition from Heavy Smoking 
(Regressive Transition) 
Dependent 
variable 
Nonsmoking/light smoking 
  
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Price (Pt) 0.108*** -- -- 0.074+ 
 (0.033) -- -- (0.045)    Price change  -- 0.030 0.076+ -- 
      (Pt-Pt-1) -- (0.026) (0.050) -- 
   Past Price  -- -- 0.071+ -- 
      (Pt-1) -- -- (0.045) -- 
   Future  Price  
      (Pt+1) 
-- -- 0.033 0.032 
-- -- (0.030) (0.030) 
   Consumption -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001* -0.0001* 
     At baseline (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Minimum Age Laws  
  PUP -0.008 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 
 Law:1 (0.071) (0.074) (0.054) (0.055) 
  PUP 0.073* 0.047 0.085** 0.085** 
   Law:2 (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
  PUP 0.066 0.064 0.091** 0.091** 
 Law:3 (0.052) (0.051) (0.044) (0.044) 
  PUP Law:1 0.111* 0.131** 0.130* 0.130* 
    *youth (0.066) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069) 
  PUP Law:2 0.043 0.059 0.045 0.046 
    *youth  (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054) 
  PUP Law:3 -0.028 -0.012 -0.025 -0.025 
    *youth  (0.082) (0.084) (0.082) (0.082) 
Smoke-free Air Laws 
 
 
  School Level1 -0.034 -0.037 -0.108** -0.108** 
 
(0.033) (0.037) (0.054) (0.054) 
 School Level2 -0.167 -0.140** -0.216*** -0.217*** 
   (0.056) (0.059) (0.065) (0.065) 
  School Level3 -0.014 -0.021 -0.098 -0.098 
 
(0.044) (0.049) (0.066) (0.066) 
 School Level4 0.231 0.280*** -- -- 
 
(0.107) (0.108) -- -- 
 School Level5 -0.022 -0.022 -0.101 -0.101 
 
(0.049) (0.054) (0.069) (0.069) 
 School Level1 0.065 0.062 0.075 0.075 
     *enrolled (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.059) 
  School Level2 0.095* 0.095* 0.096* 0.096* 
      *enrolled  (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054) 
  School Level3 0.096* 0.089 0.094 0.094 
      *enrolled (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.058) 
  School Level4 0.064 0.055 0.078* 0.078* 
      *enrolled (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
  School Level5 0.052 0.042 0.033 0.033 
     *enrolled (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) 
  Worksite 1 -0.029 -0.021 0.039 0.038 
Level (0.046) (0.048) (0.072) (0.072) 
  Worksite  -0.050 -0.048 -0.049 -0.048 
Level2 (0.058) (0.063) (0.078) (0.077) 
  Worksite  -0.086** -0.094** -0.064 -0.064 
Level3 (0.037) (0.037) (0.056) (0.056) 
  Worksite L1 -0.004 -0.002 -0.0004 -0.0004 
   *employed (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
  Worksite L2 0.051** 0.047** 0.041 0.041 
    *employed (0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) 
  Worksite L3 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.021 
    *employed (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.040) 
  Public transit 0.006 0.010 0.021 0.021 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
 Healthcare  0.039 0.029 0.010 0.010 
    Facilities (0.042) (0.043) (0.056) (0.056) 
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  Recreational  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
    facilities (0.021) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037) 
  Culture  -0.002 -0.007 -0.011 0.010 
    facilities (0.022) (0.024) (0.033) (0.032) 
  Child care  -0.036* -0.025 -0.042 -0.042 
    centers  (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) 
  Restaurants -0.030 -0.016 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.039) (0.039) 
 Shopping Malls 0.028 0.026 0.045 0.044 
 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.040) (0.039) 
 Free-standing  0.027 0.009 0.021 0.022 
    bar (0.029) (0.031) (0.047) (0.047) 
Control Programs 
 Control 
Funding/capita 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
  Other tobacco  
  control funding 
-0.014 -0.005 -0.015 -0.016 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Observations 6269 6269 5428 5428 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by states in 
parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
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Table10- Estimates of Smoking transition from Daily smoking (Regressive Transition)   
Dependent variable Competing Risk Model   
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Intermittent        None  Intermittent           None  Intermittent          None  Intermittent None 
  Price (Pt) 0.020* 0.005+ -- -- -- -- 0.034** 0.006+ 
(0.012) (0.003) -- -- -- -- (0.014) (0.004) 
  Price change(Pt-Pt-1) 
  
0.022* 0.002 0.039*** 0.006+ -- -- 
  
(0.011) (0.002) (0.015) (0.004) -- -- 
  Past Price (Pt-1) -- -- -- -- 0.029* 0.007+ -- -- 
-- -- -- -- (0.017) (0.005) -- -- 
  Future Price (Pt+1) -- -- -- -- -0.008 -0.002 -0.010 -0.002 
-- -- -- -- (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.002) 
  Consumption At baseline 
   
-0.0001*** -0.000 -0.0001*** -0.000 -0.0001*** -0.000 -0.0001*** -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Minimum Age Laws   
  PUP Law:1 0.017 0.002 0.012 0.001 -0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.003 
      *youth (0.020) (0.004) (0.021) (0.004) (0.021) (0.006) (0.021) (0.006) 
  PUP Law:2 0.021 0.0004 0.016 -0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 
      *youth (0.013) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) 
  PUP Law:3 0.015 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 
      *youth (0.015) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) 
  Possession-Use 
  -Purchase Law:1 
-0.038* 0.0002 -0.036* 0.001 -0.036 -0.000 -0.036* 0.000 
(0.020) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) (0.022) (0.002) (0.022) (0.002) 
  Possession-Use 
  -Purchase Law:2 
-0.025 0.001 -0.024 0.002 -0.024 0.001 -0.024 0.001 
(0.016) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.002) 
  Possession-Use 
  -Purchase Law:3 
-0.007 0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
(0.023) (0.002) (0.023) (0.003) (0.026) (0.003) (0.026) (0.003) 
Smoke-free Air Laws   
  School Level1 0.010 0.0003 0.010 0.00003 0.041** 0.001 0.042** 0.001 
 
(0.022) (0.005) (0.022) (0.005) (0.019) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) 
 School Level2 0.009 -0.003 0.013 -0.002 0.033 -0.003 0.033 -0.003 
     (0.026) (0.005) (0.026) (0.005) (0.024) (0.007) (0.024) (0.007) 
  School Level3 0.025 -0.001 0.024 -0.001 0.051** 0.001 0.052*** 0.001 
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     (0.022) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.020) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006) 
  School Level4 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
     -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
  School Level5 0.033 -0.0001 0.034 0.0002 0.030* 0.002 0.030* 0.002 
     (0.025) (0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (0.021) (0.006) (0.021) (0.006) 
  School Level1 
    *enrolled 
-0.031** 0.003 -0.031** 0.003 -0.030* 0.003 -0.030* 0.003 
(0.013) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) 
  School Level2 
    *enrolled 
-0.034** 0.002 -0.034** 0.002 -0.031* 0.002 -0.031* 0.002 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) 
  School Level3 
    *enrolled 
-0.021* 0.003 -0.022* 0.003 -0.020 0.004 -0.020 0.004 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) 
  School Level4 
    *enrolled 
-0.017* 0.0003 -0.020** -0.001 -0.016 0.001 -0.016 0.001 
(0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) 
  School Level5 
    *enrolled 
-0.015 0.003 -0.016 0.003 -0.016 0.002 -0.016 0.002 
(0.012) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) 
  Worksite Level1 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.0004 -0.007 -0.0003 
 
(0.012) (0.003) (0.012)_ (0.003) (0.019) (0.005) (0.019) (0.005) 
 Worksite Level2 -0.007 0.004 -0.008 0.004 -0.035 0.006 -0.034 0.006 
     (0.031) (0.005) (0.031) (0.005) (0.033) (0.009) (0.033) (0.009) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.011 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.032** 0.001 -0.032** 0.0004 
    (0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.015) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) 
  Worksite Level1 
    *employed 
0.015* 0.003 0.015* 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) 
  Worksite Level2 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.003 
    *employed (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) 
  Worksite Level3 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 
    *employed (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.001) 
  Public transit 
 
0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.013*** -0.001 0.012*** -0.001 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
  Healthcare facilities 
 
0.001 -0.003 0.0003 -0.003 0.009 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) 
  Recreational facilities -0.00003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.011 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 
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(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) 
 Culture facilities  
 
-0.012* 0.001 -0.014** 0.0004 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
  Child care centers 
 
0.007 0.0003 0.010 0.001 0.009 0.0003 0.009 0.0003 
(0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
  Restaurants 0.008 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.011 0.0005 0.011 0.001 
(0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) 
  Shopping  Malls 
 
-0.002 0.001 -0.0001 0.001 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0004 
(0.011) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) 
  Free-standing bar 
 
-0.023* 0.002 -0.028* 0.001 -0.007 0.003 -0.006 0.003 
(0.013) (0.002) (0.015) (0.001) (0.014) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) 
Control Programs 
      
  
  Tobacco control Funding 
per capita 
-0.001 0.0001 -0.001 0.0001 -0.001 0.0001 -0.001 0.0001 
(0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) 
  Other tobacco control 
funding 
-0.009** -0.00003 -0.008* 0.0003 -0.009* -0.0002 -0.009* -0.0001 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Observations 15577 15577 15577 15577 13592 13592 13592 13592 
Log Likelihood 
     
  
 Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01 
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Table11- Estimates of Smoking Transition from Light Smoking (Regressive and Progressive Transition) 
Dependent 
variable 
Competing Risk Model   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 None           Heavy None Heavy None Heavy  None Heavy 
  Price  (Pt) 0.025** -0.0002 -- -- -- -- 0.031** -0.001 
(0.010) (0.006) -- -- -- -- (0.015) (0.009) 
  Price change  -- -- 0.024** 0.001 0.036** -0.0003 -- -- 
   (Pt-Pt-1) -- -- (0.011) (0.007) (0.017) (0.010) -- -- 
  Past Price  -- -- -- -- 0.025+ -0.003 -- -- 
    (Pt-1) -- -- -- -- (0.018) (0.009) -- -- 
  Future Price  
    (Pt+1) 
-- -- -- -- -0.009 0.005 -0.010 0.004 
-- -- -- -- (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) 
  Consumption at  
     baseline 
-0.001*** 0.0003*** -0.001*** 0.0003*** -0.001*** 0.0003*** -0.001*** 0.0003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Minimum Age Laws   
  Possession-Use -0.016 -0.030** -0.019 -0.030** -0.013 -0.033*** -0.013 -0.033*** 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.025) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.024) (0.012) (0.024) (0.012) 
  Possession-Use -0.006 -0.027*** -0.012 -0.027*** -0.004 -0.025** -0.004 -0.025** 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
  Possession-Use 0.020 -0.018* 0.020 -0.018** 0.020 -0.019** 0.019 -0.019** 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.018) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) 
  PUP Law:1 0.001 0.015 0.003 0.015 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.014 
    *youth (0.018) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) 
  PUP Law:2 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.008 
    *youth (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008) 
  PUP Law:3 0.016 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.020 0.007 0.020 0.007 
    *youth (0.017) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) 
Smoke-free Air Laws   
  School Level1 -0.047** 0.055*** -0.046** 0.055*** -0.034 0.046** -0.034 0.046** 
 
(0.023) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
 School Level2 -0.053** 0.039*** -0.048* 0.039*** -0.036 0.033* -0.037 0.033* 
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(0.027) (0.014) (0.025) (0.014) (0.026) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) 
 School Level3 -0.064*** 0.048*** -0.065*** 0.048*** -0.044* 0.044** -0.044* 0.044** 
 
(0.025) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.026) (0.017) (0.026) (0.017) 
 School Level4 -0.022 0.014 -0.008 0.014 0.028 0.014 -- -- 
 
(0.041) (0.020) (0.040) (0.020) (0.046) (0.028) -- -- 
 School Level5 -0.066*** 0.019 -0.063*** 0.019 -0.054** 0.012 -0.055** 0.012 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) 
 School Level1 -0.018 -0.005 -0.017 -0.005 -0.020 -0.003 -0.019 -0.003 
     *enrolled (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) 
  School Level2 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.007 -0.010 0.005 -0.010 0.005 
     *enrolled (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) 
  School Level3 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
     *enrolled (0.022) (0.010) (0.022) (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) (0.023) (0.009) 
  School Level4 -0.033** 0.030*** -0.037** 0.030*** -0.035** 0.028*** -0.035** 0.028*** 
     *enrolled (0.017) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) 
  School Level5 -0.010 0.023** -0.011 0.023** -0.011 0.021* -0.011 0.021* 
     *enrolled (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) 
  Worksite Level1 0.024 -0.011 0.026 -0.011 0.004 -0.010 0.003 -0.010 
 
(0.025) (.010) (0.024) (0.010) (0.024) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) 
 Worksite Level2 0.008 -0.038** 0.007 -0.038** 0.017 -0.025 0.020 -0.024 
 
(0.042) (0.016) (0.041) (0.016) (0.038) (0.018) (0.037) (0.019) 
 Worksite Level3 0.014 -0.013 0.010 -0.013 0.010 -0.006 0.012 -0.006 
 
(0.028) (0.009) (0.028) (0.009) (0.022) (0.010) (0.022) (0.010) 
 Worksite Level1 0.017 0.0003 0.018 0.0002 0.015 0.002 0.015 0.002 
       *employed (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) 
  Worksite Level2 0.025* -0.001 0.025* -0.001 0.018 0.002 0.018 0.002 
       *employed (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) 
  Worksite Level3 -0.024 -0.001 -0.024 -0.001 -0.026 -0.0001 -0.026 -0.0001 
       *employed (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) 
  Public transit -0.0004 0.005** -0.0002 0.005** -0.014** 0.006 -0.014** 0.006 
 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
 Healthcare  -0.015 0.001 -0.016 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
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    facilities (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
  Recreational  -0.001 -0.007* -0.001 -0.007* 0.005 -0.006 0.005 -0.006 
     facilities (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
  Culture facilities 0.002 -0.008** -0.0004 -0.008** -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 
 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
 Child care centers 0.001 0.010* 0.004 0.010* 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.007 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
 Restaurants 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.012 0.005 -0.012 0.005 
 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
 Shopping Malls 0.016* 0.007 0.017** 0.007 0.016* 0.002 0.015 0.002 
 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
 Free-standing bar 0.021 -0.022* 0.015 -0.022* 0.021 -0.021* 0.021 -0.021 
 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.029) (0.014) (0.029) (0.013) 
Control Programs 
      
  
  Tobacco control  
  Funding per capita 
-0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Other tobacco  
  control funding 
-0.001 -0.003 0.0002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
Observations 21231 21231 21231 21231 18849 18849 18849 18849 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 
0.01 
  
 
94 
Table12- Estimates of Smoking Transition from Intermittent Smoking (Regressive and Progressive Transition) 
Dependent variable Competing Risk Model   
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 None           Daily  None Daily  None Daily  None Daily 
  Price (Pt) 0.036*** -0.016 -- -- -- -- 0.042*  
(0.012) (0.017) -- -- -- -- (0.022)  
  Price change 
   (Pt-Pt-1) 
-- -- 0.043*** -0.035* 0.055** -0** -- -- 
-- -- (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) 0.000  -- -- 
  Past Price  
  (Pt-1) 
-- -- -- -- 0.026 0 -- -- 
-- -- -- -- (0.026) 0.000  -- -- 
  Future Price 
  (Pt+1) 
-- -- -- -- -0.012 0 -0.015 0 
-- -- -- -- (0.025) 0.000  (0.024) 0.000  
  Consumption at baseline -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0* -0.0001*** 0* 
 
(0.001) (0.00001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  
Minimum Age Laws   
  Possession-Use -0.038 0.060 -0.041 0.059 0.004 0 0.004 0 
  -Purchase Law:1 (0.037) (0.043) (0.038) (0.042) (0.052) 0.000  (0.052) 0.000  
  Possession-Use 0.004 0.021 -0.004 0.024 0.025 0 0.026 0 
  -Purchase Law:2 (0.020) (0.041) (0.021) (0.040) (0.038) 0.000  (0.038) 0.000  
  Possession-Use 0.008 0.036 0.008 0.036 0.023 0 0.021 0 
  -Purchase Law:3 (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.034) (0.042) 0.000  (0.042) 0.000  
  Possession-Use -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.015 0 -0.015 0 
  -Purchase Law:1*youth (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 0.000  (0.029) 0.000  
  Possession-Use -0.012 -0.030 -0.010 -0.029 -0.021 0 -0.019 0 
  -Purchase Law:2*youth (0.019) (0.028) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019) 0.000  (0.019) 0.000  
  Possession-Use 0.003 -0.005 0.007 -0.006 0.010 0 0.010 0 
  -Purchase Law:3*youth (0.019) (0.028) (0.020) (0.028) (0.016) 0.000  (0.016) 0.000  
Smoke-free Air Laws   
  School Level1 -0.059 0.111* -0.057 0.109* 0.021 0 0.019 0 
 
(0.043) (0.059) (0.043) (0.058) (0.077) 0.000  (0.076) 0.000  
 School Level2 -0.091** 0.073 -0.083* 0.067 -0.029 0 -0.033 0 
 
(0.045) (0.078) (0.044) (0.077) (0.083) 0.000  (0.082) 0.000  
 School Level3 -0.084* 0.073 -0.084* 0.072 -0.015 0 -0.015 0 
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(0.049) (0.066) (0.048) (0.065) (0.081) 0.000  (0.079) 0.000  
 School Level4 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- -- -- -- -- --  -- --  
 School Level5 -0.096** 0.036 -0.091** 0.033 -0.065 0 -0.068 0 
 
(0.039) (0.058) (0.039) (0.057) (0.074) 0.000  (0.073) 0.000  
 School Level1*enrolled 
 
-0.021 0.018 -0.020 0.017 -0.021 0 -0.022 0 
(0.033) (0.017) (0.033) (0.017) (0.039) 0.000  (0.038) 0.000  
  School Level2*enrolled 
 
-0.004 0.015 -0.003 0.016 -0.004 0 -0.004 0 
(0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (0.021) (0.037) 0.000  (0.036) 0.000  
  School Level3*enrolled 
 
-0.002 0.013 -0.002 0.012 0.005 0 0.005 0 
(0.036) (0.021) (0.036) (0.021) (0.042) 0.000  (0.042) 0.000  
  School Level4*enrolled 
 
-0.016 0.012 -0.021 0.012 -0.033 0 -0.034 0 
(0.035) (0.018) (0.035) (0.018) (0.039) 0.000  (0.039) 0.000  
  School Level5*enrolled 
 
-0.011 0.026 -0.013 0.026 0.010 0 0.010 0 
(0.037) (0.027) (0.037) (0.027) (0.049) 0.000  (0.048) 0.000  
  Worksite Level1 -0.007 -0.023 -0.006 -0.023 -0.045 0 -0.044 0 
   (0.035) (0.063) (0.034) (0.063) (0.066) 0.000  (0.064) 0.000  
  Worksite Level2 -0.059 0.040 -0.065 0.045 -0.066 0 -0.056 0 
 
(0.055) (0.100) (0.053) (0.099) (0.095) 0.000  (0.092) 0.000  
 Worksite Level3 0.015 -0.030 0.009 -0.021 -0.006 0 -0.001 0 
   (0.045) (0.077) (0.045) (0.014) (0.076) 0.000  (0.074) 0.000  
  Worksite Level1 
    *employed 
0.011 0.022 0.014 0.021 0.015 0 0.014 0 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.020) 0.000  (0.020) 0.000  
  Worksite Level2 0.030** -0.007 0.031** -0.007 0.025* 0 0.025* 0 
    *employed (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) 0.000  (0.013) 0.000  
  Worksite Level3 -0.044* 0.030 -0.043* 0.030 -0.031 0 -0.031 0 
     *employed (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) 0.000  (0.029) 0.000  
  Public transit 
 
0.015 0.006 0.016* 0.006 -0.007 0 -0.009 0 
(0.010) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) 0.000  (0.016) 0.000  
  Healthcare facilities 
 
-0.005 0.039 -0.005 0.038 0.015 0 0.015 0 
(0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.030) (0.025) 0.000  (0.025) 0.000  
  Recreational facilities 0.011 -0.010 0.011 -0.010 0.013 0 0.013 0 
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(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) 0.000  (0.016) 0.000  
 Culture facilities 
 
-0.007 -0.017 -0.012 -0.014 -0.026 0 -0.023 0 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 0.000  (0.017) 0.000  
  Child care centers 
 
-0.014 0.032** -0.010 0.031** 0.007 0 0.007 0 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) 0.000  (0.020) 0.000  
  Restaurants -0.014 -0.026 -0.012 -0.026 -0.054*** 0 -0.055*** 0 
(0.014) (0.027) (0.013) (0.026) (0.019) 0.000  (0.019) 0.000  
  Shopping Malls 
 
0.017 -0.008 0.019 -0.010 0.034 0 0.032 0 
(0.014) (0.022) (0.012) (0.022) (0.021) 0.000  (0.021) 0.000  
  Free-standing bar 
 
0.039 -0.033 0.029 -0.030 0.033 0 0.033 0 
(0.033) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.043) 0.000  (0.044) 0.000  
Control Programs 
      
  
  Tobacco control  
  Funding per capita 
-0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 0 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 0.000  (0.002) 0.000  
  Other tobacco  
  control funding 
-0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0 -0.008 0 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) 0.000  (0.010) 0.000  
Observations 12887 12887 12887 12887 11596 11596 11596 11596 
Marginal Effects in the table. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses, *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1, **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 
0.01 
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Table 13 A Summary of  the Effects of Preventions on Smoking Transitions 
Intervention Initiation Restart Quit 
Heavy Daily Daily Light Light Inter Inter None None 
→ → → → → → → → → 
Non-heavy Inter None Heavy None Daily None Inter Light 
  Real cigarette price (Pt) 
  
₊ ₊ ₊ ₊ 
 
₊ 
 
₊ 
    Price change (Pt-Pt-1) 
  
₊ ₊ ₊ ₊ 
 
₊ ₋ ₊ 
    Past Price (Pt-1) 
  
₊ ₊ ₊ ₊ 
 
₊ 
    Minimum Age Laws (MAL) 
              PUP - - 
 
₊ 
  
₋ 
     Smoke-free Air Laws 
              School  
              Worksite  
  
₊ 
 
₊ 
 
₋ ₊ 
  
₋ 
   Public transit 
    
₊ 
         Recreational facilities 
      
₋ 
       Culture facilities - 
     
₋ 
   
₋ 
   Child care centers 
        
₊ 
     Restaurants 
              Shopping Malls 
  
₊ 
    
₊ 
      Free-standing bar ₋ ₋ 
    
₋ 
   
₋ ₋ 
  Tobacco control   Funding 
per capita ₋ 
     
₋ 
   
₋ ₋ 
  Other tobacco  control 
funding ₋       
 
              
+ indicates that the intervention significantly increase the smoking transition in the column head; - sign indicates that the intervention significantly decreased the 
probability of the smoking transition in the column head. 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 8 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix: Youth Access laws and Smoke-free air law coding scheme: 
• STM: Minimum age for sale: The minimum age in years required by state law to purchase 
tobacco products (possible values: 0 = no minimum age; 16, 17, 18, or 19 years old).  
• Possession-Use-Purchase Index: Sum of ‗Minors’ possession, use, and purchase prohibited’ 
variables. This index represents the number of possession, use, and/or purchase laws (PUP laws) 
present for a given state and year (possible values: 0 = no PUP laws; 1 = 1 PUP law present; 2 = 2 
PUP laws present; 3 = all 3 PUP laws present).  
• School Coding Scheme  
– 0 No provision/not meet a restriction  
– 1 Restrict smoking to designated areas  
– 2 Restrict smoking to separately ventilated areas or a ban when children are 
present with exemptions  
– 3 Ban when children are present (school buildings)  
0.00 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
1.00 
0 2 4 6 8 10 
Analysis time 
Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimate-Restarting 
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– 4 Ban at all times when children are present (buildings and grounds)  
– 5 Ban at all times (buildings and grounds)  
• Location Restriction Decisions in worksites (bars/public transit/restaurants/ shopping 
malls/health care facilities) 
– 0 No provision/not meet a restriction  
– 1 Restrict smoking to designated smoking areas (DSAs) or require separate 
ventilation with exemptions for locations of a certain size (e.g. restaurants with a 
seating capacity of less than 50)  
– 2 Restrict smoking to separately ventilated areas or a ban with exemptions for 
certain locations where only a restriction applies  
– 3 Ban at all times  
• Childcare Center Coding Scheme  
– 0 No provision/not meet a restriction  
– 1 Restrict smoking to designated areas  
– 2 Restrict smoking to separately ventilated areas or a ban when children are 
present with exemptions  
– 3 Ban when children are present (commercial daycare)  
– 4 Ban at all times when children are present (explicitly including home-based)  
– 5 Ban at all times (explicitly including home-based)  
• Recreational Facilities Coding Scheme:  
– 0 No restriction  
– 1 Restricts smoking to DSAs in gyms or arenas  
– 2 Restricts smoking to DSAs in both gyms and arenas  
– 3 Restricts smoking to DSAs in all recreational facilities  
– 4 Bans smoking in gyms or arenas and restricts to DSA(s) in other recreational 
area(s)  
– 5 Bans smoking at all recreational locations  
• Cultural Facilities Coding Scheme:  
– 0 No restriction  
– 1 Restricts smoking to DSAs in fewer than 3 cultural areas  
– 2 Restricts smoking to DSAs in 3-5 cultural areas  
 105 
 
– 3 Restricts smoking to DSAs in more than 5 cultural areas  
– 4 Restricts smoking to DSAs in all cultural facilities  
– 5 Bans smoking at all cultural locations  
 
Appendix Table1-  Non-addictive Models Exclusive of Policy Variables 
Dependent 
variable 
consumption equation Participation equation 
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cigarette  -27.37*** -14.01* -13.12* -0.031** -0.008 -0.003 
   Price (Pt) (9.119) (8.211) (6.711) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) 
price elasticity -0.239*** -0.123* -0.115* -0.180** -0.047 -0.015 
 (0.080) (0.072)  (0.059)  (0.064) (0.051)  (0.039) 
Individual Fixed 
effects 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Observations 28438 28438 28438 86239 86239 86239 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic 
variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
 
Appendix Table1B-  Non-addictive Models Inclusive of SASS 
Dependent 
variable 
consumption equation Participation equation 
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cigarette  -34.25*** -16.87* -14.83* -0.017+ -0.010+ -0.007+ 
   Price (Pt) (9.151) (9.491) (7.700) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) 
price elasticity -0.300*** -0.148* -0.130* -0.100+ -0.055+ -0.064+ 
 (0.080) (0.083)  (0.067)  (0.069) (0.037)  (0.066) 
Individual Fixed 
effects 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Observations 28438 28438 28438 86239 86239 86239 
 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic 
variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table1C- Estimates of Pooled Sample (Fixed-Effects 
Model) 
Dependent 
variable 
Consumption (nonsmokers smoke 0 
cigarettes) 
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cigarette  -8.674** -7.668** -8.433** -7.463** 
   Price (Pt) (3.950) (3.450) (4.158) (3.613) 
price elasticity -0.224** -0.198** -0.217** -0.191** 
 (0.102) (0.089)  (0.107)  (0.093) 
State Fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
SASS No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 86239 86239 86239 82639 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic 
variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table1D-  Rational Models _ Pooled Sample   
Dependent 
variable 
consumption equation (nonsmokers smoke 0 cigarettes) 
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Past  0.403*** 2.732 0.263* 0.414*** 0.403*** 0.731 0.281* 0.427*** 
Consumption (0.008) (3.829) (0.148) (0.131) (0.008) (1.688) (0.147) (0.134) 
Future 0.399** -1.946 0.353* 0.407*** 0.399*** 0.240 0.349* 0.391** 
Consumption (0.007) (3.675) (0.148) (0.157) (0.007) (1.053) (0.183) (0.154) 
Cigarette  -4.467** -24.03 -6.233+ -4.346+ -4.136* -4.819 -5.782+ -4.152+ 
   Price (Pt) (2.082) (31.76) (3.859) (2.664) (2.149) (6.672) (3.873) (2.661) 
price elasticity -0.115** -0.148* -0.160+ -0.112+ -0.106* -0.124 -0.149+ -0.107+ 
 (0.054) (0.083)  (0.099)  (0.069) (0.055)  (0.172) (0.100) (0.068) 
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV No P-1/P+1 Exog Ex/En No P-1/P+1 Exog Ex/En 
Observations 63066 63066 63066 63066 63066 63066 63066 63066 
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Appendix Table2-   Non-addictive Models (Cigarette Tax effect and its elasticity ) 
Dependent 
variable 
consumption equation Participation equation 
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Cigarette  -46.68*** -27.97** -25.89*** -0.032* -0.007 -0.018 
   Tax  (Tt) (12.216) (11.39) (8.536) (0.018) (0.008) (0.015) 
tax elasticity -0.118*** -0.071** -0.066*** -0.052* -0.012 -0.030 
 (0.031) (0.029)  (0.022)  (0.029) (0.013)  (0.025) 
Individual Fixed 
effects 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Observations 28438 28438 28438 82639 86239 86239 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and 
demographic variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
 
 
 
Appendix Table3-   The Effects of Tax on Smoking Transitions 
Dependent  
variable 
Initiation Restarting Quit Heavy to none-heavy 
Cigarette  0.004 -0.022 0.027*** 0.099*** 
     Tax  (Tt) (0.007) (0.021) (0.009) (0.039) 
  Dependent  
variable 
Daily to  Daily to  Intermittent Intermittent Light to Light to  
 Intermittent None To None To Daily None Heavy 
Cigarette  0.019+ 0.005+ -0.019 0.022 0.0002 0.020* 
   Tax  (Tt)  (0.014) (0.003)  (0.020)  (0.018) (0.006)  (0.011) 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic 
variables, consumption of cigarettes at baseline for smokers, state fixed effects and year fixed 
effects as column1 of each table for smoking transitions. +sign indicates significance in one-
tailed test.  
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Appendix Table4-   First Cigarette Smoking Initiation  (Robustness Check) 
Dependent variable   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Annual Price  -0.008 -- -0.006 -0.010+ -- -0.008 
   (0.007) -- (0.013) (0.007) -- (0.012) 
Annual Price  -- 0.0004 -- -- 0.0006 -- 
Change -- (0.009) -- -- (0.009) -- 
Annual Future  -- -- -0.006 -- -- -0.0004 
Price -- -- (0.011) -- -- (0.009) 
Annual Past Price -- -- -0.001 -- -- -0.008 
 -- -- (0.009) -- -- (0.012) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Price  0.001 -- 0.004 -0.0002 -- 0.003 
   (0.005) -- (0.007) (0.005) -- (0.007) 
Price Change -- 0.006 -- -- 0.006 -- 
 -- (0.005) -- -- (0.005) -- Future Price -- -- 0.003 -- -- 0.003 
 -- -- (0.006) -- -- (0.006)  Past Price -- -- -0.011* -- -- -0.013* 
 -- -- (0.006) -- -- (0.007) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Annual Price  -0.009+      
 (0.006)      
State Fixed effects No      
Policies Yes      
Observations 35486 35486 32838 35486 35486 32838 
Note: Regressions also control for year fixed effects, policy variables, socioeconomic 
variables and demographic variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table5-   Intermittent Cigarette Smoking Initiation  (Robustness Check) 
Dependent variable   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Annual Price  -0.002 -- -0.005 -0.003 -- -0.005 
   (0.002) -- (0.004) (0.002) -- (0.005) 
Annual Price  -- -0.001 -- -- -0.001 -- 
Change -- (0.001) -- -- (0.001) -- 
Annual Future  -- -- 0.003 -- -- 0.002 
Price -- -- (0.003) -- -- (0.003) 
Annual Past Price -- -- -0.001 -- -- -0.002 
 -- -- (0.002) -- -- (0.003) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Price  -0.001 -- -0.001 -0.001 -- -0.001 
   (0.001) -- (0.002) (0.001) -- (0.002) 
Price Change -- 0.001 -- -- 0.001 -- 
 -- (0.001) -- -- (0.001) -- Future Price -- -- 0.002 -- -- 0.002 
 -- -- (0.002) -- -- (0.002)  Past Price -- -- -0.003 -- -- -0.003 
 -- -- (0.003) -- -- (0.003) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 57839 57839 53154 57839 57839 53154 
Note: Regressions also control for year fixed effects, policy variables, socioeconomic 
variables and demographic variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table5B-   Daily Cigarette Smoking Initiation  (Robustness Check) 
Dependent variable   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Annual Price  -0.001 -- -0.004 -0.001 -- -0.004 
   (0.001) -- (0.004) (0.002) -- (0.004) 
Annual Price  -- -0.001 -- -- -0.001 -- 
Change -- (0.001) -- -- (0.001) -- 
Annual Future  -- -- 0.002 -- -- 0.002 
Price -- -- (0.002) -- -- (0.002) 
Annual Past Price -- -- 0.0004 -- -- -0.00002 
 -- -- (0.002) -- -- (0.008) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Price  -0.0004 -- -0.0004 -0.001 -- -0.0005 
   (0.001) -- (0.002) (0.002) -- (0.002) 
Price Change -- 0.0003 -- -- 0.0003 -- 
 -- (0.001) -- -- (0.001) -- Future Price -- -- 0.001 -- -- 0.001 
 -- -- (0.001) -- -- (0.001)  Past Price -- -- -0.001 -- -- -0.002 
 -- -- (0.002) -- -- (0.002) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 62211 62211 57010 62211 62211 57010 
Note: Regressions also control for year fixed effects, policy variables, socioeconomic 
variables and demographic variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table5C-   Five Cigarettes per Day Smoking Initiation  (Robustness Check) 
Dependent variable   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Annual Price  -0.001 -- -0.002 -0.002 -- -0.003 
   (0.003) -- (0.005) (0.003) -- (0.005) 
Annual Price  -- -0.001 -- -- -0.001 -- 
Change -- (0.002) -- -- (0.002) -- 
Annual Future  -- -- 0.001 -- -- 0.001 
Price -- -- (0.003) -- -- (0.003) 
Annual Past Price -- -- 0.0004 -- -- -0.0004 
 -- -- (0.003) -- -- (0.003) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Price  -0.00002 -- 0.004 -0.0002 -- 0.004 
   (0.002) -- (0.003) (0.002) -- (0.003) 
Price Change -- 0.003 -- -- 0.003* -- 
 -- (0.002) -- -- (0.002) -- Future Price -- -- -0.00004 -- -- 0.00003 
 -- -- (0.002) -- -- (0.003)  Past Price -- -- -0.005* -- -- -0.006* 
 -- -- (0.003) -- -- (0.003) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 62144 62144 56977 62144 62144 56977 
Note: Regressions also control for year fixed effects, policy variables, socioeconomic 
variables and demographic variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table5D-   Ten Cigarettes per Day Smoking Initiation  (Robustness Check) 
Dependent variable   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Annual Price  -0.002 -- -0.006 -0.002 -- -0.006 
   (0.002) -- (0.005) (0.002) -- (0.005) 
Annual Price  -- 0.001 -- -- 0.001 -- 
Change -- (0.002) -- -- (0.002) -- 
Annual Future  -- -- 0.005 -- -- 0.005 
Price -- -- (0.004) -- -- (0.004) 
Annual Past Price -- -- -0.003 -- -- -0.003 
 -- -- (0.003) -- -- (0.003) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Price  -0.001 -- -0.003 -0.001 -- -0.003 
   (0.001) -- (0.003) (0.001) -- (0.003) 
Price Change -- -0.0001 -- -- -0.0001 -- 
 -- (0.002) -- -- (0.002) -- Future Price -- -- 0.003 -- -- 0.003 
 -- -- (0.003) -- -- (0.003)  Past Price -- -- -0.002 -- -- -0.002 
 -- -- (0.003) -- -- (0.003) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 68172 68172 62219 68172 68172 62219 
Note: Regressions also control for year fixed effects, policy variables, socioeconomic 
variables and demographic variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table5E-   Fifteen Cigarettes per Day Smoking Initiation  (Robustness 
Check) 
Dependent variable   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Annual Price  -0.004+ -- -0.012* -0.005+ -- -0.013* 
   (0.003) -- (0.007) (0.003) -- (0.007) 
Annual Price  -- -0.003 -- -- -0.003 -- 
Change -- (0.006) -- -- (0.006) -- 
Annual Future  -- -- 0.006 -- -- 0.006 
Price -- -- (0.004) -- -- (0.004) 
Annual Past Price -- -- 0.001 -- -- 0.001 
 -- -- (0.009) -- -- (0.008) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 35272 35272 32198 35272 35272 32198 
Price  -0.002 -- 0.004 -0.0003 -- -0.0004 
   (0.002) -- (0.007) (0.002) -- (0.004) 
Price Change -- 0.004 -- -- 0.004 -- 
 -- (0.004) -- -- (0.004) -- Future Price -- -- 0.005 -- -- 0.005 
 -- -- (0.003) -- -- (0.003)  Past Price -- -- -0.008 -- -- -0.008 
 -- -- (0.006) -- -- (0.006) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 35272 35272 32198 35272 35272 32198 
Note: Regressions also control for year fixed effects, policy variables, socioeconomic 
variables and demographic variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table6-   Smoking Restarting  (Robustness Check) 
Dependent variable   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Annual Price  -0.028 -- 0.014 0.025 -- 0.045 
   (0.029) -- (0.042) (0.019) -- (0.044) 
Annual Price  -- 0.025 -- -- 0.022 -- 
Change -- (0.032) -- -- (0.030) -- 
Annual Future  -- -- -0.002 -- -- -0.006 
Price -- -- (0.041) -- -- (0.038) 
Annual Past Price -- -- -0.075* -- -- -0.053 
 -- -- (0.038) -- -- (0.035) State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 11159 11159 9399 11170 11170 9408 
Price  0.004 -- -0.018 0.004 -- -0.018 
   (0.016) -- (0.031) (0.015) -- (0.031) 
Price Change -- -0.037+ -- -- -0.037+ -- 
 -- (0.024) -- -- (0.024) -- Future Price -- -- -0.011 -- -- -0.011 
 -- -- (0.025) -- -- (0.025)  Past Price -- -- 0.025 -- -- 0.025 
 -- -- (0.036) -- -- (0.037) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11170 11170 9408 11170 11170 9408 
Note: Regressions also control for year fixed effects, policy variables, socioeconomic 
variables and demographic variables. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table7-   Transition from Heavy Smoking  (Robustness Check) 
Dependent variable   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Annual Price  0.090+ -- -- 0.034+ -- -- 
   (0.057) -- -- (0.026) -- -- 
Annual Price  -- -0.018 0.026 -- -0.022 -0.015 
Change -- (0.037) (0.062) -- (0.036) (0.050) 
Annual Future  -- -- 0.035 -- -- 0.026 
Price -- -- (0.042) -- -- (0.037) 
Annual Past Price -- -- 0.067 -- -- 0.035 
 -- -- (0.062) -- -- (0.042) State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 6269 6269 5428 6280 6280 5436 
Price  0.066* -- -- 0.058*** -- -- 
   (0.019) -- -- (0.019) -- -- 
Price Change -- 0.028 0.052 -- 0.031 0.052 
 -- (0.025) (0.044) -- (0.025) (0.044) Future Price -- -- 0.019 -- -- 0.019 
 -- -- (0.029) -- -- (0.029) Past Price   0.051+   0.050+ 
   (0.035)   (0.035) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6280 6280 5436 6280 6280 5436 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and 
demographic variables, consumption of cigarettes at baseline for smokers, year fixed effects. 
+sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table1 7B- Smoking Transition from Heavy Smoking _Ten Cigarettes Cut Off  
(Robustness check) 
 
Dependent variable Competing Risk Model   
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Light           None Light None Light None Light None 
  Annual Price  0.026+ 0.002 -- -- 0.013 0.001 -- -- 
(0.019) (0.003) -- -- (0.014) (0.001) -- -- 
  Annual Price change 
    
-- -- 0.006 -0.001 -- -- 0.008 -0.001 
-- -- (0.015) (0.001) -- -- (0.017) (0.001) 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Price  0.024** 0.002 -- -- 0.020** -0.001 -- -- 
(0.010) (0.003) -- -- (0.009) (0.002) -- -- 
  Price change 
    
-- -- 0.003 0.001 -- -- 0.006 0.001 
-- -- (0.011) (0.001) -- --  (0.012) (0.002) 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10785 10785 10785 10785 10785 10875 10875 10875 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic variables, consumption of cigarettes at 
baseline for smokers, year fixed effects. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table8-   Smoking  Cessation (Robustness Check) 
Dependent variable   
Independent  
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Annual Price  0.028** -- -- 0.0004 -- -- 
   (0.012) -- -- (0.010) -- -- 
Annual Price  -- 0.005 0.050*** -- 0.003 0.031* 
Change -- (0.012) (0.015) -- (0.012) (0.016) 
Annual Future  -- -- -0.025* -- -- -0.025 
Price -- -- (0.014) -- -- (0.015) 
Annual Past Price -- -- 0.056*** -- -- 0.029* 
 -- -- (0.019) -- -- (0.017) State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Price  0.013** -- -- 0.014*** -- -- 
   (0.006) -- -- (0.005) -- -- 
Price Change -- 0.024*** 0.036*** -- 0.024*** 0.037*** 
 -- (0.008) (0.013) -- (0.008) (0.013) Future Price -- -- -0.011 -- -- -0.011 
 -- -- (0.012) -- -- (0.012) Past Price   0.020+   0.022* 
   (0.014)   (0.13) State Fixed effects No No No No No No 
SASS No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27162 27162 5436 27162 27162 23975 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and 
demographic variables, consumption of cigarettes at baseline for smokers, year fixed effects. 
+sign indicates significance in one-tailed test. 
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Appendix Table1 9- Smoking Transition from Intermittent Smoking (Robustness check)  
Dependent variable Competing Risk Model   
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 None           Daily  None Daily  None Daily  None Daily 
  Annual Price  0.047+ -0.040+ -- -- -0.012 -0.018 -- -- 
(0.033) (0.026) -- -- (0.023) (0.018) -- -- 
  Annual Price change 
    
-- -- 
0.036+ -0.053* 
-- -- 
0.028 
-
0.046+ 
-- -- (0.027) (0.028) -- -- (0.026) (0.026) 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Price  -0.001 -0.010 -- -- 0.001 -0.010 -- -- 
(0.014) (0.012) -- -- (0.013) (0.012)  -- -- 
  Price change 
    
-- -- 
0.042*** -0.034* -- -- 
0.042*** -
0.034* 
-- -- (0.015) (0.020) -- -- (0.015) (0.020) 
State Fixed effects No No No No No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12887 12887 12887 12887 12887 12887 12887 12887 
 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic variables, consumption of cigarettes at 
baseline for smokers, year fixed effects. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test.
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Appendix Table1 10- Smoking Transition from Light Smoking (Robustness check)  
Dependent variable Competing Risk Model   
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 None           Heavy  None Heavy  None Heavy  None Heavy 
  Annual Price  0.009 0.003 -- -- -0.011 0.0001 -- -- 
(0.025) (0.009) -- -- (0.015) (0.007) -- -- 
  Annual Price change 
    
-- -- -0.002 0.002 -- -- -0.002 0.002 
-- -- (0.018) (0.008) -- -- (0.017) (0.008) 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Price  0.006 -0.002 -- -- 0.009 -0.001 -- -- 
(0.008) (0.005) -- -- (0.007) (0.005) -- -- 
  Price change 
    
-- -- 0.026** -0.001 -- -- 0.026** -0.002 
-- -- (0.010) (0.007) -- --  (0.010) (0.007) 
State Fixed effects No No No No No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21231 21231 21231 21231 12887 21231 21231 21231 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic variables, consumption of cigarettes at 
baseline for smokers, year fixed effects. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test.
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Appendix Table1 10B- Smoking Transition from Light Smoking _Ten Cigarettes Cutoff  
(Robustness check) 
 
Dependent variable Competing Risk Model   
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 None           Heavy  None Heavy  None Heavy  None Heavy 
  Annual Price  0.024 0.010 -- -- -0.010 0.004 -- -- 
(0.032) (0.013) -- -- (0.019) (0.009) -- -- 
  Annual Price change 
    
-- -- 0.015 0.005 -- -- 0.012 0.005 
-- -- (0.023) (0.014) -- -- (0.020) (0.014) 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Price  0.034*** 0.009 -- -- 0.010 0.002 -- -- 
(0.010) (0.009) -- -- (0.009) (0.006) -- -- 
  Price change 
    
-- -- 0.037*** -0.002 -- -- 0.036*** -0.002 
-- -- (0.011) (0.011) -- --  (0.011) (0.011) 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16776 16776 16776 16776 16676 16676 16676 16676 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic variables, consumption of cigarettes at 
baseline for smokers, year fixed effects. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test.
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Appendix Table1 11- Smoking Transition from Non-Smoking (Robustness check)  
Dependent variable Competing Risk Model   
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Inter           Daily  Inter Daily  Inter Daily  Inter Daily 
  Annual Price  -0.003 -0.002 -- -- -0.009+ -0.001 -- -- 
(0.008) (0.002) -- -- (0.006) (0.001) -- -- 
  Annual Price change 
    
-- -- -0.013+ 0.0004 -- -- -0.016* 0.0004 
-- -- (0.008) (0.001) -- -- (0.009) (0.001) 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Price  0.002 -0.0003 -- -- 0.001 -0.0003 -- -- 
(0.005) (0.001) -- -- (0.005) (0.001) -- -- 
  Price change 
    
-- -- -0.011** 0.003 -- -- -0.011** 0.0003 
-- -- (0.005) (0.001) -- --  (0.005) (0.001) 
State Fixed effects No No No No No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 55786 55786 55786 55786 55786 55786 55786 55786 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic variables, consumption of cigarettes at 
baseline for smokers, year fixed effects. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test.
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Appendix Table1 12- Smoking Transition from Non-Smoking (Robustness check)  
Dependent variable Competing Risk Model   
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Light          Heavy  Light Heavy  Light Heavy  Light Heavy 
  Annual Price  -0.012+ -- -- -- -0.011+ -- -- -- 
(0.009) -- -- -- (0.007) -- -- -- 
  Annual Price change 
    
-- -- -0.010+ -- -- -- -0.011+ -- 
-- -- (0.008) -- -- -- (0.008) -- 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Price  0.001 -- -- -- -0.0002 -- -- -- 
(0.005) -- -- -- (0.004) -- -- -- 
  Price change 
    
-- -- -0.007 --- -- -- -0.007 -- 
-- -- (0.006) -- -- --  (0.006) -- 
State Fixed effects No No No No No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 56649 56649 56649 56649 56649 56649 56649 56649 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic variables, consumption of cigarettes at 
baseline for smokers, year fixed effects. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test.  
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Appendix Table13- Smoking Transition from Daily Smoking (Robustness check)  
Dependent variable Competing Risk Model   
Independent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 None           Inter  None Inter None Inter  None Inter 
  Annual Price  0.003 -0.004 -- -- 0.001 0.006 -- -- 
(0.003) (0.014) -- -- (0.001) (0.009) -- -- 
  Annual Price change 
    
-- -- -0.001 0.019 -- -- -0.0003 0.021+ 
-- -- (0.002) (0.018) -- -- (0.002) (0.017) 
State Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Price  0.003+ 0.023*** -- -- 0.003+ 0.019** -- -- 
(0.002) (0.009) -- -- (0.002) (0.008)  -- -- 
  Price change 
    
-- -- 0.002 0.022** -- -- 0.002 0.023** 
-- -- (0.002) (0.011) -- -- (0.002) (0.011) 
State Fixed effects No No No No No  No No No  
SASS No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15577 15577 15577 15577 15577 15577 15577 15577 
Note: Regressions also control for policy variables, socioeconomic variables and demographic variables, consumption of cigarettes at 
baseline for smokers, year fixed effects. +sign indicates significance in one-tailed test.
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